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water	 provision	 system.	 Based	 on	 this	 argument,	 the	 concept	 of	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix	 is	











of	 consumer’s	 institutional	 distrust	 in	 semi-potable	 tap	 water.	 With	 this	 institutionalised	 distrust,	 an	
imbalanced	dialectical	relationship	between	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	the	Consumer	Coping	
Strategy	Matrix	 and	water	 crises	will	 turn	 consumer	 into	 the	 trigger	of	 sociogenic	water	 sustainability	
crises.	A	detailed	case	study	of	Harbin	is	presented	to	demonstrate	the	two	sociogenic	water	sustainability	
crises	occurred	in	Harbin	with	archival	data	and	the	establishments	of	contingent	combination	model,	and	




























































































































































































































water	 resources	 is	 full	 of	 challenges.	 China’s	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 is	 one	 of	 the	most	 complex	
government	 administration	 systems,	 which	 has	 been	 influenced	 by	 at	 least	 three	 government	





with	 each	 other,	 which	would	 give	 rise	 to	 the	 outbreak	 of	 a	 sociogenic	 water	 sustainability	 crisis	 (its	
definition	will	be	introduced	in	section	3.9).	A	comprehensive	understanding	of	these	three	perspectives,	











political,	 economic	 power	 relations	 fuse	 the	 physical	 and	 the	 managerial	 together	 in	 particular	 and	
invariably	socially	uneven	ways.’		
Why	 does	 the	 consumer’s	 trust	 in	 tap	water	 deserve	 our	 attention?	 There	 is	 a	 simple	 answer	 to	 this	
question.	It	is	because	the	pervasive	institutional	distrust	of	the	urban	tap	water	in	China	has	become	such	
an	obvious	social	fact	that	no	one	can	deny	its	existence	and	ignore	the	social	unrests	it	has	triggered	in	
recent	years.	 In	other	words,	 the	 theme	of	 ‘trust	 in	water’	 is	not	an	 invention,	but	a	 reflection	of	 the	
problem	that	already	exists	 in	Chinese	people’s	 lives.	 It	 is	not	only	related	to	a	series	of	environmental	
accidents	and	scandals,	but	also	the	centre	of	many	debates.	In	other	words,	it	is	not	the	theories	that	





is	 in	 this	 country	 that	 the	 largest	water	 diversion	project	 in	 human	history,	 the	 South-to-North	Water	

































water,	 given	 the	 survey	 result	of	 the	 treated	water	quality	among	4457	urban	water	 treatment	plants	














66%	 (Gong	 and	 Liu,	 2012).	 With	 respect	 to	 the	 secondary	 water	 supply	 (or	 decentralised	
locally/community	managed	water	 supply	equipment/facilities),	 the	administration	of	 its	equipment	 is	
varying	 by	 cities.	 In	 some	 undeveloped	 cities,	without	 effective	 administration	 and	 supervision,	 these	
facilities	have	been	problematic	for	a	long	time,	reflecting	on	occasional	news	about	dead	mouse	in	the	
water	 tank3.	 Finally,	 these	 facilities	are	always	managed	by	 local	 community	 services,	who	are	neither	
qualified	nor	have	a	willingness	to	manage	them.	Finally,	regarding	public	participation,	in	many	cities	and	
counties	of	China,	public	visits	to	the	local	tap	water	treatment	plants	are	strictly	controlled,	if	not	fully	






However,	 compared	 to	 the	passion	 for	 technology	 innovation	 studies,	 few	 research	papers	 have	been	











Moreover,	 there	 is	 a	 general	 neglect	 of	 social	 research	 in	 the	production	process	of	 tap	water,	 not	 to	
mention	to	study	it	in	the	context	of	the	particular	country,	culture,	political	regime,	economic	pattern	and	
social	routine,	and	to	study	its	associated	impacts	on	the	different	agents	of	urban	tap	water	provision	
system.	As	Mark	Harvey	 (2015,	p.15)	 rightly	pointed	out,	 ‘much	of	 the	discussion	around	processes	of	
qualification	has	been	focused	on	market	commodities	(of	which	commercial	bottled	water	is	a	case	in	
point).’		
Why	 has	 such	 an	 essential	 environmental-sociological	 topic	 been	 neglected	 by	 China’s	 social	 science	
researchers	for	such	long	time?	One	possible	explanation	is	that	given	the	particular	cultural,	social	and	
technological	 backgrounds	 of	 the	 tap	water	 provision	 system,	 despite	 having	 experienced	 several	 tap	
water	crises,	the	acceptance	of	semi-potable	urban	tap	water	(this	concept	is	defined	in	section	3.2)	has	
















tap	water	provision	 system	and	 ‘consumer-made	potable	water.’	A	neglect	of	 this	 individualised	water	
























have	occurred	 in	 the	recent	history	of	Harbin.	Chapter	6	presents	 institutional	analysis	on	the	basis	of	
synchronised	 interview	 materials	 from	 four	 interviewees	 in	 key	 responsibility	 of	 Harbin’s	 tap	 water	
provision	 system,	 revealing	 the	 intricacies	 of	 China’s	 ‘source	 to	 consumer’	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	
provision	system,	underlining	the	production	of	semi-potable	tap	water	and	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	
Matrix	 as	 the	 inevitable	 outcomes	 of	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture.	 In	 the	 end,	 the	 general	
discussion	of	the	thesis	is	concluded	in	Chapter	7.	






establishing	 a	 research	 rationale	 to	 study	 trust	 in	 tap	 water	 is	 how	 to	 keep	 a	 balance	 between	 the	
generality	and	specificity	of	‘trust’	and	‘tap	water.’		














logic	 for,	 and	 the	 springboards	 of	 inquiry	 into,	 the	 main	 research	 question	 of	 this	 thesis:	 What	 is	
consumer’s	institutional	trust	and/or	distrust	in	China’s	tap	water?	
Compared	to	the	traditional	research	pathway	that	dives	into	the	massive	literature	and	data	regarding	
trust	 and	 tap	 water,	 this	 research	 rationale	 aims	 to	 constitute	 the	 foundations	 for	 the	 theoretical	
framework,	paving	the	way	for	an	in-depth	examination	of	these	two	concepts.	Such	a	research	rationale	









defined	 in	 the	 first	question.	 It	 is	an	 intermediate	question	that	connects	 the	analyses	at	a	macro	and	
micro	level.	The	third	question	focuses	on	the	tap	water	consumer’s	role,	a	crucial	factor	that,	to	a	large	
extent,	compensates	the	deficiencies	of	the	current	urban	tap	water	provision	system.		This	three-level	











thesis	 mainly	 relies	 on	 data	 from	 authoritative	 news	 websites	 or	 government	 official	 news	 websites.	
Among	 these	 archival	 data,	 the	 Chinese	 archival	 data	 is	 mainly	 collected	 through	 online	 databases,	
including	but	not	limited	to	China’s	Core	Newspaper	Database,	China’s	Core	Journal	Database,	and	China’s	




















reorganised	 by	 interviewee	 to	 reflect	 the	 social	 issues	 predicated	 on	 them	 in	 an	 abstraction	 form.	
Accordingly,	ten	people	who	hold	important	positions	in	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	have	been	
interviewed	in	this	thesis,	including	three	experts	in	tap	water	provision	and	sewage	treatment,	one	senior	
official	 in	water	 administration	 department,	 one	 senior	 official	 in	 health	 supervision	 department,	 one	
senior	engineer	in	water	treatment	plant,	one	senior	official	in	water	supply	group,	one	senior	manager	
























through	 other	 means.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 obstacles,	 restrictions	 and	 limited	 channels	 of	 access	 to	
interviewing	stakeholders	in	the	water	provision	system	are	themselves	an	indication	of	why	there	is	a	lack	
of	public	trust	in	tap	water	provision.	
Those	 interview	materials	 have	 been	 embedded	 in	 Chapter	 3	 for	 theory	 development,	 Chapter	 4	 for	
institutional	analysis,	and	Chapters	5	and	6	for	a	case	study	of	Harbin’s	current	tap	water	provision	system.	
During	 this	 process,	 both	 the	 name	 and	 the	 identities	 of	 interviewees	 have	 been	 anonymised	 for	
confidentiality.	
During	 the	 semi-structured	 interviews,	 none	 of	 the	 respondents	 have	 disclosed	 any	 confidential	 data	
regarding	any	organisations.	Most	of	their	narratives	are	about	their	experiences	and	opinions.	As	it	may	
occur	in	any	interview	analysis,	there	is	a	risk	of	misinterpretation	and	misunderstanding.	To	deal	with	this	
risk,	 the	 interview	materials	 are	 analysed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 their	 current	 jobs,	 and	 their	 opinions	 are	
examined	 in	 light	of	 the	data	 collected	 in	 the	archival	 research	 introduced	 in	 the	previous	 section.	By	
combining	 these	 two	methodologies,	 the	potential	 risks	 is	 counteracted	 to	 an	 acceptable	degree.	 The	
interview	materials	are	translated,	organised	and	analysed	through	NVivo.	
These	 interviews	are	designed	on	 the	basis	of	every	 interviewee’s	situation	specifically,	with	 the	semi-
structured	format	and	open-ended	questions.	This	design	is	predicated	on	two	considerations:	first,	the	
aim	 of	 these	 interviews	 is	 not	 to	 test	 any	 existed	 hypotheses,	 but	 to	 construct	 new	 hypotheses.	 The	


















and	 urban	 tap	water	 are	 broad	 research	 themes.	 Case	 study	 is	 useful	 to	 specify	 their	 generality	 to	 a	
tangible	degree	through	integrating	a	series	of	specific	temporal,	geographical,	environmental,	political,	
economic	and	 social	 conditions	 into	analysis.	 Second,	a	detailed	 scrutiny	of	urban	 tap	water	provision	
system	would	be	helpful	to	summarise	the	developmental	trajectories	of	other	Chinese	cities’	urban	tap	
water	provision	systems.	
Third,	given	the	difficulties	associated	with	the	research	on	trust	 in	 individual	 level,	the	case	study	can	
provide	a	compensation	to	the	understanding	of	consumer’s	reaction	to	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	









Besides,	 as	will	 be	 demonstrated	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 the	 institutional	 analysis	 of	 urban	 tap	water	 provision	
system,	especially	the	institutional	analysis	of	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	(its	definition	will	be	
coined	in	section	3.4)	requires	a	holistic	research	perspective	to	establish	the	causality	between	reality	






















analysis	 in	 China’s	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 from	 a	 consumer	 perspective.	 To	 have	 a	
comprehensive	understanding	of	the	risk	of	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis,	which	has	yet	been	fully	
studied,	 demands	 an	 examination	 of	 China’s	 tap	 water	 consumer.	 To	 achieve	 this	 goal,	 consumer’s	












To	 have	 a	 general	 view	 of	 the	 political	 characteristics	 of	 water	 resources,	 a	 scrutiny	 of	 historical	
perspectives	 is	 required.	 In	 the	 late	20th	century,	 there	was	a	heated	and	controversial	debate	on	the	
relationship	between	power,	water,	and	political	regimes.	




and	the	emergence	and	operation	of	despotic	 regimes.	Presenting	 the	 idea	of	 ‘oriental	despotism,'	he	
argued	that	behind	these	despotisms	there	was	a	‘hydraulic	society’	whose	legal	and	moral	foundation	is	
the	 operation	 of	 a	 comprehensive	mechanism	of	 hydraulic	 facilities.	 However,	 he	 did	 not	 place	much	
emphasis	on	the	connection	between	the	hydraulic	facilities	and	tap	water	supply	facilities,	just	claimed	
that	the	former	were	the	grounds	for	the	latter.	
Based	 on	 the	 critique	 of	 communist	 ideology,	 Wittfogel	 used	 his	 theory	 as	 a	 weapon	 to	 attack	 the	
legitimacy	of	the	so-called	despotic	regimes.	Such	a	controversial	attempt	severely	divided	the	directions	
of	 further	 research	 by	 inspiring	 two	 new	 waves	 of	 research	 on	 the	 interaction	 between	 hydraulic	








whose	 main	 themes	 were	 to	 denounce	 Wittfogel's	 work	 critically.	 In	 1997,	 a	 collection	 titled	 The	
Comments	of	Wittfogel’s	Work	 ‘Oriental	Despotism’	was	published	based	on	 the	outcomes	of	 the	 two	
symposia.	It	consists	of	15	articles	by	18	prominent	Chinese	historians,	criticising	Wittfogel’s	work	from	
different	historical	and	theoretical	perspectives	(Li,	1997).	For	example,	one	contribution	argues	that	there	













the	 next	 section.	 Francois	 Molle	 (2009)	 underlined	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘hydraulic	 bureaucracies’	 from	













riverine	 environment’	 (Molle,	 Mollinga	 and	Wester,	 2009,	 p.329).	 These	 professionals	 always	 occupy	
leadership	 roles	 in	 various	 water	 resources	 management	 agencies,	 thus	 creating	 what	 is	 labeled	 as	
‘hydraulic	bureaucracies.’	Molle’s	work	tried	to	avoid	the	cold	war	style	of	debate	over	ideology	divergence,	
which	was	one	of	the	main	themes	in	Wittfogel,	resulting	in	the	omission,	to	a	large	extent,	of	the	direct	

























water	 scarcity,	 paving	 the	 way	 for	 the	 following	 hydraulic	 facilities,	 which	 sustains	 the	 current	 socio-
economic	arrangement	and	opens	up	the	opportunity	for	privatisation.	In	other	words,	the	manifestation	
of	water	scarcity	was	driven	by	the	social	agents	who	would	like	to	benefit	from	shifting	power	relations	
associated	with	 the	 new	water	 resources	 arrangement.	 In	 China,	 particularly	 in	 developed	 cities,	 the	
situation	 is	 the	 total	 opposite:	 the	 sense	 of	water	 affluence	 is	 socially	 and	 politically	 constructed	 and	
normalised	 to	 function	 as	 the	 stabiliser	 of	 the	 current	 urban	 tap	water	 provision	 system.	 This	will	 be	
analysed	in	further	in	Chapter	3.		
At	the	specific	level	of	hydraulic	facility	construction,	the	traditional	motivations	have	gradually	ceased	to	




and	 agricultural	 development	 has	 ceased	 to	 be	 the	 facilitator	 for	 constructing	 large-scale	 hydraulic	
facilities.	 Instead,	with	the	soaring	urbanisation,	the	construction	of	tap	water	provision	system	is	now	
increasingly	 important	 for	 infrastructure	 development.	 However,	 they	 also	 suffer	 numerous	
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administration	 drawbacks.	 Chapter	 3	 will	 illustrate	 such	 importance	 and	 drawbacks	 with	 systematic	
analyses.	
2.2 The	 economic	 characteristics	 of	 water	
resources	
In	Chinese	academia,	the	discussions	around	economic	characteristics	of	water	resources	can	be	seen	as	
policy-oriented	and	practical-oriented.	This	 inevitably	 leads	 to	a	 fact	 that	most	studies	are	 focusing	on	
specific	 economic	 indicators	 instead	 of	 general	 relationship	 between	 economy,	 nature	 and	 society.	 In	
other	words,	water	 resources	 is	 always	 being	 studied	 in	 the	 economic	 context	 that	 isolate	 itself	 from	
natural	 and	 societal	 contexts.	 However,	 as	 Harvey	 (2015,	 p.3)	 pointed	 out,	 tap	water	 ‘[…]	 provided	 a	





integrate	not	only	economy	but	also	nature	and	 society,	but	 also	being	developed	 from	UK’s	practical	
experience	in	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	









commodification	 in	 neoliberalization,	 arguing	 that	 tap	 water	 is	 an	 ‘uncooperative	 commodity’	 when	





connection	 with	 cultural,	 political,	 legal,	 biological	 and	 environmental	 processes.	 The	 concept	 of	 the	
economy	in	his	research	is	defined	from	sociological	and	anthropological	one,	which	means	that	there	is	























ownership	 and/or	management	 right	 from	 the	 central	 authority	 to	 private	 actors.	 Thus,	 it	 entails	 the	
change	of	organisational	ownership.	Marketisation	 includes	commodification	and	commercialisation,	 it	
changes	 the	mode	 of	 natural	 resource	management,	 emphasising	 the	 commercial	 principles	 (such	 as	
efficacy),	methods	(such	as	cost-benefit	assessment),	and	objectives	(such	as	profit-maximization)	(Bakker	
and	Bridge,	2006).	Thus,	it	entails	an	institutional	change,	which	may	include	the	change	of	rules,	norms,	












Bakker	 emphasised	 the	 essential	 function	 of	 historically-geographically	 specific	 practices.	 By	 this	
perspective,	neoliberalisation	is	a	re-regulation	and	reconfiguration	process	to	adjust	the	role	of	the	state	
in	 regulating	 natural	 resources	 within	 the	 context	 of	 ‘market	 environmentalism’	 (Bakker,	 2003,	 p.1).	
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However,	 the	 true	 competition	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 cost-reflective	 pricing	 has	 been	 proved	
ineffective,	which	impeded	the	development	of	neoliberalisation	process.	The	water	resource’s	inherent	
characteristics	‘[…]	render	it	particularly	resistant	to	commodification’	(Bakker,	2005,	p.559).	For	example,	





privatisation	 and	 marketisation	 processes	 was	 not	 fully	 demonstrated	 and	 failed	 in	 dealing	 with	 the	
contradictions	 in	 the	process	of	modifying	water	 resource,	 resulting	 in	a	 failure	of	neoliberalisation	of	
nature	resource.	However,	she	only	discussed	neoliberal	governance	 in	a	de-centralised	administration	
mechanism.	 This	 thesis	 will	 contribute	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 neoliberalisation	 through	 providing	 a	
detailed	analysis	of	Chinese	centralised	administration	of	water	resources	and	tap	water	provision	system	
and	its	attempt	of	marketisation	reform.	







claimed,	 his	 account	 is	 to	 respond	 Bakker’s	 analysis	 of	 neoliberalism	 ‘[…]	 by	 arguing	 for	 an	 historical	







demonstrate	 themselves	 in	 various	 forms,	 especially	 in	 the	 taken-for-granted	 availability	 of	 tap	water.	














By	adopting	 Instituted	Economic	Process	and	 recognising	Polanyi’s	 two	constitutional	processes	of	 the	
economy,	the	processes	of	displacing	entities	in	space	and	processes	of	changing	who	exercises	control	
over	 those	 entities,	 Harvey	 (2015,	 p.9)	 further	 developed	 another	 two	 constitutional	 processes	 of	
economy,	 the	 processes	 of	 transformation	 of	 qualitative	 characteristics	 of	 entities	 (objects,	 activities,	
people)	and	processes	of	transformation	of	the	functionality	of	using	those	entities.	Note	here	that	these	
four	 processes	 have	 constituted	 a	 research	 nexus	 combining	 both	 the	 geographic	 and	 political	
perspectives	into	the	research	of	economy,	reflecting	the	openness	of	this	research	mode.		






tap	 water	 quality	 transitions,	 from	 undrinkable	 nature	 water	 to	 standardised	 tap	 water.	 Regarding	
functionality	changes,	the	processes	of	transformation	of	the	functionality	of	using	those	entities	reveal	a	


























is	 also	 inevitably	 connected	with	political	 power	 (Swyngedouw,	 2006).	 Thus,	 taking	 a	 holistic	 research	
perspective,	water	 flow,	money	 flow	 and	 power	 flow	 always	 demonstrates	 themselves	 in	 an	 intricate	
network	of	each	other.	
This	 conceptual	 triad	 centres	 on	 the	 contests	 around	 the	 access	 to	water.	 Swyngedouw	believed	 that	
during	 the	 process	 of	 accessing	 water,	 there	 are	 various	 contests	 among	 people	 of	 different	 classes,	
genders	 and	 ethnicities.	 This	 demonstrates	 the	 relationships	 of	 domination	 and	 subordination	




water	 and	 authoritarian	 political	 and	 economic	 power	 relations’	 (Swyngedouw,	 2006,	 p.17).	 As	
demonstrated	in	the	previous	section,	this	so-called	‘link’	has	been	criticised	by	Chinese	academia	as	well.	
While	keeping	a	safe	distance	from	this	argument,	Swyngedouw	at	the	same	time	tried	to	stress	that	there	









the	 resulting	chain	 reactions	 that	are	 triggered	by	such	 inequality	and	 its	associated	 influences	on	 the	
other	agents	have	yet	to	be	fully	revealed.	
Second,	 following	 this	 restriction,	 in	his	 research	 the	analyses	of	 tap	water	consumer	was	 inadequate.	
They	can	be	considered	as	people	who	do	get	access	to	tap	water	through	purchasing	but	still	 lack	the	
power	to	deal	with	other	agents	in	the	tap	water	provision	system.	Those	people,	even	though	may	be	in	






































































































equivalents	 to	 ‘coping	strategy’.	 In	his	blog	article,	he	defined	boiled	water	as	Chinese	 ‘individual	 safe	
drinking	water	solution’,	which	parallels	to	government’s	‘public	health	solution’.	With	discussion	about	
its	 incomprehensiveness,	 he	 argued	 that	 this	 is	 a	 phenomenon	 related	 to	 people’s	 distrust	 in	 water,	
















work	 existing	 after	 consumption.	 Grounded	 by	 Zukin’s	 work,	 Jon	 Goss	 (2006)	 further	 elaborated	 the	
concept	of	work	of	consumption	in	its	commercial	context,	but	he	still	confined	his	analysis	to	a	practical	
level	rather	than	posting	it	into	a	bigger	picture	as	labour	division.	In	her	seminal	work	published	in	2009,	






the	 seller	 to	 the	 consumer	 without	 further	 activities,	 enforcing	 consumers	 to	 be	 integrated	 into	 the	
provisioning	system	by	 implementing	these	activities.	Thus,	she	defines	consumption	work	as	 ‘all	work	
undertaken	by	consumers	necessary	 for	 the	purchase,	use,	 re-use	and	disposal	of	consumption	goods’	
(Glucksmann,	 2013,	 p.2).	 She	 further	 added	 that	 ‘the	 work	 of	 consumers	 includes	 a	 whole	 range	 of	
activities	both	before,	during	and	post-acquisition	of	goods	or	services	that	are	a	precondition	of	using	or	
appreciating	 them.	 Each	 good	 or	 service	 comes	 with	 its	 specific	 range	 of	 consumption	 work	 tasks’	
(Glucksmann,	 2013,	 p.10).	 She	 also	 pointed	 out	 that	 consumption	 works	 vary	 by	 different	 countries,	
cultures,	traditions	(Glucksmann,	2013,	p.7).	
Three	major	features	of	this	definition	have	been	highlighted	in	her	work:	first,	there	is	interdependent	
labour	 prior	 and	 after	 the	 purchase	 behaviour;	 second,	 the	 labour	 after	 the	 purchase	 should	 be	
distinguished	 from	 consumption;	 and	 third,	 the	 division	 of	 labour	 has	 been	 expanded	 from	 the	 paid	
employment	in	the	market	to	the	unpaid	labour	beyond	the	market.	Accordingly,	she	suggests	that	the	
role	 of	 the	 consumer	 should	 be	 revisited,	 and	 the	 notions	 of	 production	 and	 consumption	 should	 be	
modified.	














as	 she	emphasised,	 has	been	marginalised	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 labour	division,	which	mainly	 focuses	on	
agents	in	the	context	of	market	relations	before	the	commodity	reaches	the	consumer.		






























At	 the	 individual	 level,	 the	 study	of	 trust	 always	associates	with	other	 key	 factors,	 such	as	 leadership,	
knowledge,	rumour	transmission,	and	the	relationship	between	the	individual	and	other	entities.	Niclas	













Another	 significant	 research	 tendency	 is	 to	 illuminate	 the	 interpersonal	 trust	 regarding	 economic	
rationality.	Since	trust	can	be	interpreted	as	anti-rationality	interaction,	at	the	same	time	it	demonstrates	
a	 strong	 willingness	 to	 take	 the	 risk	 of	 exposing	 the	 trustor’s	 weakness	 to	 the	 trustee	 either	 as	 a	
consequence	of	a	belief	in	a	partner’s	good	intent,	belief	in	their	competence	and	capability,	belief	in	their	
reliability,	or	belief	in	their	perceived	openness	(Nahapiet	and	Ghoshal,	1998).	Contrary	to	this,	James	S	







trustee.	 However,	 Coleman’s	 theory	 ignores	 an	 important	 question:	 how	 could	 people	 achieve	 the	
























to	 which	 different	 elements	 could	 be	 examined	 in	 certain	 historical-geophysical	 dimensions.	 Mark	
Granovetter	(2008)	acknowledged	the	idea	of	trust	as	a	social	mechanism	that	is	embodied	in	structures	












































































However,	many	 previous	 studies	 and	 government	 documents	 defined	 tap	water	 solely	 from	 technical	






as	 ‘the	water	 supplied	by	urban	 tap	water	 supply	enterprises	 through	public	water	pipeline	and	other	















Second,	 these	 definitions	 did	 not	 take	 into	 consideration	 about	 the	 influence	 of	 residual	 chemical	
compounds	in	tap	water,	such	as	residual	chlorine	and	its	by-products.	Currently,	most	water	treatment	
plants	in	China	use	chlorine	or	chlorine	dioxide	as	traditional	water	disinfection	method.	Through	chemical	


















the	 physical	 and	mental	 activity	 of	 the	 users.	 There	 is,	 therefore,	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 a	
resource	in	the	abstract	or	a	resource	which	exists	as	a	‘thing	in	itself’.	






consumer’s	 physical	 and	 mental	 activities	 and	 their	 associated	 influence	 on	 tap	 water	 quality.	 In	 his	
concept	 of	 socio-natural	 unity,	 Swyngedouw	 (2004)	 emphasised	 that	 tap	 water	 is	 integrated	 into	 the	

















in	 section	 2.4,	 the	 concept	 of	 consumption	 work	 was	 considered	 as	 consumer’s	 physical	 and	mental	
activity	and	social	labour	to	make	use	of	the	commodity	they	have	purchased	(Glucksmann,	2013,	p.2).	
When	this	commodity	is	a	‘resource,'	consumer	then	becomes	the	user	of	resource,	and	their	consumption	







Therefore,	 with	 taking	 consumption	 work	 and	 consumer	 coping	 strategy	 into	 consideration,	 a	 new	
perspective	is	constituted.	It	is	necessary	to	present	a	new	definition	of	tap	water	from	this	perspective.	
























of	 institutional	 analysis	 in	 his	 theoretical	 framework	 Instituted	 Economic	 Process.	 In	 section	 2.3,	


















Together,	 all	 these	 nexuses	 establish	 the	 channels	 for	 the	 flow	 of	 power/money/water.	 By	 illustrating	
functions	of	these	agents	and	relationships	between	them,	this	section	reveals	that	the	urban	tap	water	















process	 that	 China’s	 ‘source	 to	 consumer’	 urban	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 can	 be	
compensated	into	a	‘source	to	sip’	urban	potable	tap	water	provision	system.	
3.4 ‘Source	 to	 consumer’	 urban	 semi-potable	 tap	
















can	 be	 captured.	 From	 source	 to	 consumer,	 there	 are	 (at	 least)	 16	 agents	 functioning	 as	




















source	 located	 in	 a	 water	 environment.	 It	 then	 was	 sent	 to	 the	 aqueduct	 of	 one	 or	 more	 hydraulic	
constructions	(such	as	a	reservoir	and	water	transfer	project).	









by	advanced	treatment	technology.	The	outlet	water	 from	the	water	 treatment	plant	should	meet	 the	
national	 tap	water	 standard	and	 is	 conveyed	 through	 the	pipeline	 to	different	urban	areas	 for	 various	



















As	 shown	 in	 the	 Figure	 3.2,	 these	 aforementioned	 seven	 agents	 are	 in	 general	 administered	 by	 nine	











flow	 from	 consumer	 to	 the	water	 company.	 In	many	 cases,	 these	water	 companies	 are	 State-Owned-
Enterprise	 (SOE).	 In	 some	 cases,	 they	 are	 privately	 owned	 or	 supported	 by	 private	 capital,	 and	 the	
municipal	 government	 would	 sign	 concession	 contracts	 such	 as	 BOT	 (Building-Operation-Transfer)	




















that	 keeps	 the	power/money	 flow	 from	 central	 government	 to	manage	urban	water	 affairs.	However,	




two	 institutional	 incoherencies	 in	 power	 flow	 can	 be	 observed.	 The	 first	 institutional	 incoherency	 is	
between	MHURD	and	MWR;	the	second	is	between	MEP	and	MWR.	These	will	be	highlighted	in	the	next	
chapter.	Meanwhile,	 since	 local	municipal	 government	became	 the	only	administration	department	of	
urban	 tap	water	provision	 system,	 there	 is	 a	 risk	of	 distrust	between	 local	municipal	 government	 and	







mainly	 about	 the	 ambiguous	 power	 boundary	 on	 water	 source	 administration,	 which	 can	 be	 either	
administrated	 by	 MEPB	 or	 by	 MWAB.	 The	 latter	 incoherency	 is	 primarily	 about	 the	 incoherent	
administration	of	water	treatment	plant,	pipeline,	water	company,	and	secondary	water	supply	facility.	












different,	 the	 centre	 of	 this	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 is	 always	 the	 combination	 of	 the	 water	
company,	government	departments,	water	treatment	plants	and	(sometimes)	hydraulic	projects.		
The	 power/money/water	 flows	 and	 the	Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 are	 causally	 interrelated	 and	
mutually	 strengthened.	 It	 is	 the	 circulation	 of	 flows	 of	 power/money/water	 that	 form	 the	 policy	
































As	 shown	 in	 Figure	3.3,	by	 implementing	 the	 certain	 tap	water	 coping	 strategy,	 consumers	have	been	
deeply	 integrated	 into	 the	 process	 of	 potable	 tap	 water	 production.	 If	 inspecting	 the	 whole	 Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture	from	an	economic	stance,	it	can	be	divided	into	four	phases:	water	appropriation,	
water	 production,	 water	 distribution	 and	 water	 consumption.	Water	 production	 is	 merely	 one	 phase	














Along	 with	 this	 whole	 process	 water	 production	 and	 distribution	 mechanism,	 certain	 production	

















in	 the	 context	 of	 central	water	 supply,	 the	 power	 of	 building	 self-built	water	 supply	 facility	would	 be	
deprived	by	the	government,	making	consumers	only	depend	on	other	consumer	coping	strategies.	The	




of	water	 production	 and	 distribution	mechanism	 also	 disguises	 the	 irresponsibility	 of	 other	 agents	 in	
Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture.	What’s	more,	 this	mechanism	 further	 intensifies	 the	marginalisation	





To	 date,	 there	 has	 been	 no	 research	 discussing	 the	missing	 link	 between	 the	 semi-potable	 tap	water	
received	by	China’s	tap	water	consumers	and	the	potable	tap	water	produced	by	them.	Many	research	


















Although	 the	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	 Matrix	 is	 as	 fundamental	 as	 ‘source	 to	 consumer’	 Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture,	 its	existence	is	as	unnoticeable	as	those	social	norms	and	routines	that	have	
been	widely	accepted	and	taken-for-granted	by	nearly	all	Chinese	people.	In	other	words,	it	becomes	the	
‘ordinariness’	 (introduced	 in	section	2.4)	of	people’s	daily	 life.	With	the	prevalent	of	Consumer	Coping	
Strategy	Matrix,	consumers	are	gradually	alienated	and	marginalised	in	tap	water	provision	system	as	a	


























Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	 Matrix	 deeply	 and	 firmly	 into	 the	 fabric	 of	 Chinese	 society.	 As	 will	 be	
highlighted	 in	 section	 3.6,	 the	 normalisation	 they	 triggered	 will	 have	 a	 re-enforcement	 of	 other	























special	government	officers	 in	 regulating	water	quality.	They	projected	heated	stone	 into	 the	water	 to	
repel	 insects.	 In	 Eastern	 Jin	 dynasty	 (317-420	AD),	 a	 scholar	 specialised	 in	health,	 Zhang	 Zhan,	 clearly	
pointed	out	in	his	book	The	Essence	of	Health	（《养生要集》）that	‘once	people	drink	boiled	water,	no	


















to	 2000	 years	 ago,	 decoction	medicine	 was	 considered	 as	 the	major	mean	 of	medical	 treatment.	 	 It	
involves	boiling	water	to	extract	and	concentrate	the	essence	of	substances	deemed	to	be	curative	(e.g.	
bark,	 leaves,	 roots).	 In	other	 classic	works	of	Chinese	medicine,	decoction	was	 considered	as	 the	best	
choice	for	taking	medicine,	being	used	as	the	most	common	way	for	medical	treatment.	As	shown	in	Figure	



































tap	 water	 provision	 system,	 for	 a	 long	 time	 the	 government	 has	 kept	 a	 tacit	 consent	 towards	 the	
implementation	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	In	some	cities,	the	local	municipal	government	even	
shifted	a	certain	amount	of	power	 to	 the	consumer	 to	promote	their	 ‘non-central	water	supply’	as	an	
option	for	‘central	water	supply’.	Chapter	5	will	provide	a	detailed	example	later.	
Besides,	 it	 is	the	government	who	firstly	 initiate	and	promote	the	national	propaganda	for	plain	boiled	
water.	As	early	as	1934,	Chinese	Nationalist	Party,	the	China’s	ruling	party	at	that	time,	promoted	New	Life	
Movement,	which	 asked	Chinese	people	 to	drink	boiled	water9	.	 Chiang	Kai-shek,	 the	head	of	 Chinese	










of	 Continuing	 Patriotic	 Public	 Health	 Campaign	 in	 1953’	 highlighted	 that	 people	 must	 ‘not	 drinking	
unboiled	water’.	Given	the	record	in	the	memoirs	of	Guan	Er,	an	old	man	who	experienced	that	campaign	
as	a	child,	even	in	rural	areas,	every	child	would	be	checked	before	class	whether	they	had	brought	the	
jug	 for	drinking	boiled	water,	and	every	child	had	to	recite	a	doggerel	 including	 ‘not	drinking	unboiled	




As	Glucksmann	 (2013,	 p.12)	 pointed	 out,	 the	 consumption	work	 intensified	 the	 connections	 between	
different	market	 players,	 forming	 a	mutual	 cooperation	 between	 them.	 She	 further	 claimed	 that	 the	




When	 little	 academic	 attention	 was	 placed	 in	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	 Matrix,	 the	 capsulate	 of	















filtration	equipment	 is	massive.	As	 Liu	 (2006)	pointed	out,	 ‘bottled	water	is	now	one	of	China's	fastest	
growing	sectors	in	the	food	and	drink	industry’.	
The	booming	bottled	water	market	in	China	is	more	like	the	emergence	of	bottled	water	in	the	history	of	















































the	benefits	 of	 drinking	 plain	 boiled	water,	which	was	written	 in	 classic	 Chinese	 and	published	 in	 the	
second	volume	of	Xin	Min	News	(《新民晚报》),	one	of	the	earliest	newspapers	in	modern	China.		
Later,	 a	 series	 of	 propaganda	 articles	 about	 the	 benefits	 of	 drinking	 boiled	water	 can	 be	 observed	 all	
through	the	publication	history	of	China’s	newspapers,	advocating	plain	boiled	water	as	healthy	water.	For	
example,	 given	 the	 searching	 result	 from	 a	 newspaper	 database 14	,	 ‘plain	 boiled	 water’	 has	 been	
mentioned	5132	times	in	all	news	titles	and	contents	of	China’s	newspapers	published	in	2016.	Among	16	
most	mentioned	words	associated	with	 ‘plain	boiled	water,'	at	 least	 four	words	are	associate	people’s	




The	 fifth	 facilitating	 factor	 is	 the	 low	 tap	water	 rates.	 Because	 of	 the	 consideration	 of	 public	welfare,	
China’s	urban	tap	water	rates	is	always	keeping	at	a	relatively	low	level.	This	low	water	rates	significantly	





price,	 since	 it	 is	not	 simply	a	 reflection	of	 supply	and	demand	 in	a	market	 that	 contains	 competitions	
between	various	companies.	It	is	an	outcome	of	complicated	political	and	economic	negotiation	between	











based	 in	 Beijing	 of	 deliberate	 defaming	 the	 company’s	 reputation.	 In	 April	 2014,	 Lanzhou’s	 residents	
rushed	to	buy	bottled	drinks	after	authorities	had	said	benzene	had	been	found	in	tap	water	at	20	times	














their	 health	 from	 the	 threat	 of	water	 crisis	 (See	 Figure	 3.4).	 The	 difference	 in	 consumer’s	 capacity	 of	
adopting	coping	strategy	leads	to	a	consumer’s	stratification,	which	will	be	highlighted	in	section	3.5.3	of	





The	 seventh	 facilitating	 factor	 is	 consumer’s	 knowledge	 and	 information	 gap.	Most	 previous	 research	




















In	 fact,	 even	 the	 agents	 in	 the	Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 have	 information	 and	 knowledge	 gap	
between	 each	 other,	 not	 to	mention	 the	 gap	 between	 them	 and	 consumers.	 Section	 6.4	 and	 6.5	will	
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present	a	detailed	case	study	 regarding	problematic	 information	disclosure	between	 the	agents	 in	 the	
Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	and	between	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	and	consumers.	
Third,	 in	 the	aforementioned	context,	 the	central	government	 still	 restricted	 the	development	of	both	
oversea	 and	 local	 NGOs	 through	 various	 means.	 The	 overseas	 NGO’s	 activities	 were	 mainly	 actively	
restricted	by	regulations,	whereas	local	NGO’s	activities	were	mianly	confined	by	local	government	and	
insufficient	 funds.	 Meanwhile,	 rather	 than	 establishing	 an	 effective	 communication	 between	 Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture	and	consumers,	most	Industrial	Associations	have	posted	their	main	attention	










From	 this	 production	 process,	 two	 types	 of	 potable	 water	 are	 ‘produced’	 through	 Consumer	 Coping	
Strategy	Matrix:	potable	tap	water,	produced	through	Tap	Water	Coping	Strategy;	and	potable	non-tap-

















Matrix	 in	 the	 ‘consumer	 to	 sip’	 potable	 water	 production	 process.	 Note	 here	 that	 this	 consumer’s	
stratification	is	an	original	concept	of	this	thesis.	Since	it	 is	established	on	the	basis	of	another	original	
concept,	 namely	 the	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix,	 currently	 there	 is	 no	 archival	 evidence	 either	
proving	 its	existence	or	describing	 its	 function	 in	 the	 real	world.	 In	other	words,	 this	 stratification	 is	a	
theoretical	assumption	derived	from	induction	associated	with	the	concept	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	
Matrix.		
Here,	 consumer’s	 capacity	 of	 adopting	 consumer	 coping	 strategies	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 Coping	 Capacity.	
Different	coping	strategies	bestow	consumer	different	Coping	Capacity.	Meanwhile,	the	more	these	coping	








Coping	 Strategy,	 either	 the	 boiled	 water	 or	 the	 self-built	 water	 supply	 facilities.	 Although	 their	 exact	
situations	are	unknown	and	required	more	in-depth	research	to	reveal,	a	certain	connection	between	their	
limited	 Consumer	 Coping	 Capacity	 and	 their	 limited	 income	 and	 their	 residence	 locations	 can	 still	 be	
presumed.	On	the	one	hand,	 if	 they	can	only	adopt	coping	strategy	of	self-built	water	supply	facilities,	
then	they	are	presumed	to	have	limited	incomes	and	live	in	areas	where	tap	water	is	not	available.	On	the	
other,	 if	 they	 can	only	adopt	 coping	 strategy	of	boiled	water,	 then	 they	are	presumed	 to	have	 limited	


















































of	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 not	 only	 disguises	 the	 its	 own	 problems	 but	 also	 enables	 the	
production	responsibility	shift	in	the	achievement	of	potable	water.	Consequently,	a	vicious	circle	can	be	
observed:	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	produces	the	semi-potable	tap	water,	which	then	promotes	
Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	 Matrix,	 and	 through	 mutual	 self-reinforcement,	 their	 existences	 are	 all	
normalised	 by	 the	 consumer,	 who	 have	 to	 bear	 the	 production	 responsibility	 to	 produce	 their	 own	







sewerage	 system,	 consumer	 movements	 became	 a	 major	 stimulation	 for	 the	 transition	 of	 industrial	
configuration,	resulting	a	new	integrated	water-sewage	organisation	(Harvey,	2015).	In	China,	there	is	also	
a	tension	between	the	semi-potable	tap	water	supplied	by	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	
water	 provision	 system	 and	 tap	 water	 consumers.	 However,	 such	 a	 tension	 did	 not	 give	 rise	 to	 any	
significant	 consumer	 movements	 for	 potential	 transition	 of	 industrial	 configuration,	 but	 fostered	
Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	which	strengthened	in	further	the	consumer’s	normalisation	to	semi-
potable	 tap	water	and	Hybrid	 Institutional	Architecture.	 In	other	words,	 compare	 to	consumers	 in	UK,	
Chinese	 consumers	 did	 not	 turn	 the	 tension	 into	 stimulation,	 but	 choose	 to	 cope	 the	 tension	 by	
themselves,	which	makes	the	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	keep	
in	 a	 stable	 and	 self-balanced	 status.	 For	 many,	 such	 tension	 has	 transformed	 into	 another	 form	 of	























production	 process	 are	 the	 mutual	 self-reinforcements	 of	 normalisation,	 which	 have	 normalised	 any	
potential	obstacles	of	combination,	especially	 the	consumer’s	possible	dissatisfaction	of	potable	water	
production	responsibility	and	their	reasonable	suspicions	of	tap	water	quality	and	their	query	of	Hybrid	





it	would	 also	 paralyse	 the	 operation	 of	 this	 seemingly	 potable	water	 provision	 system.	 This	 has	 been	
demonstrated	in	the	case	study	in	Chapter	5.	
Here,	it	is	worthwhile	to	recapitulate	the	establishment	of	‘source	to	sip’	urban	potable	tap	water	provision	















normalisation	 transforms	 such	normalisation	 into	 the	normalisation	of	 semi-potable	 tap	water	 supply,	
which	is	then	transformed	into	the	normalisation	of	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	All	three	kinds	of	
normalisation	 are	mutually	 self-reinforced.	 Such	 normalisations	 become	 the	 glue	 between	 	 ‘source	 to	
consumer’	 urban	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 and	 ‘consumer	 to	 sip’	 potable	 tap	 water	
production	process,	turning	them	into	a	stable	and	self-balanced	‘source	to	sip’	urban	potable	tap	water	
provision	 system.	 Because	 its	 seemingly	 potable	 water	 provision	 capacity,	 this	 system	 disguises	 the	
existence	of	both	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	and	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	
3.8 Consumer's	 Institutional	 distrust	 in	 semi-
potable	tap	water	
This	section	aims	to	answer	 the	main	research	question:	What	 is	consumer’s	 institutional	 trust	and/or	




The	 understanding	 of	 China’s	 ‘source	 to	 sip’	 urban	 potable	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 provides	 a	
foundation	for	the	discussion	of	consumer’s	trust	in	tap	water.	In	this	context,	three	factors	need	to	be	
highlighted:	First,	in	this	trust	relationship,	the	trustor	is	a	consumer,	and	the	trustee	is	tap	water.	Second,	
consumer’s	 trust	 in	 tap	water	should	be	 interpreted	within	the	two	systems,	 the	 ‘source	to	consumer’	
semi-potable	 tap	water	provision	 system	and	 the	 ‘consumer	 to	 sip’	potable	water	production	process,	






As	 Harvey	 (2015,	 p.29)	 pointed	 out,	 compared	 to	 the	 economic	 arrangements	 engendered	 by	 other	
commodities,	the	entire	distribution	and	production	process	of	tap	water	is	characterised	by	‘technology	
monopoly’.	 For	 the	 consumer,	 what	 behind	 such	 ‘technology	 monopoly’	 is	 Hybrid	 Institutional	













regarding	 the	 dysfunction	 of	 NGO	 and	 industrial	 association.	 With	 such	 powerlessness,	 consumer’s	


























would	ask	 the	question:	what	 substance	does	not	 include	 in	 the	water?	 If	 you	ask	me	whether	water	
pollution	is	harmful,	I	would	answer	yes.	However,	if	you	ask	me	about	the	risk	of	this	harm,	I	would	say	it	

















In	 the	 context	 of	 consumer’s	 powerlessness,	 consumer’s	 dual	 identities,	 and	 the	 problematic	 public	
propaganda,	it	can	be	concluded	that	in	general,	China’s	tap	water	consumer	have	an	institutional	distrust	










that	 the	 institutional	distrust	was	not	 raised	either	between	 the	consumer	and	 the	water	company	or	
between	 the	 consumer	 and	 the	 government,	 but	 between	 the	 consumer	 and	 the	Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture.	What	is	behind	consumer	is	‘consumer	to	sip’	tap	water	production	process,	what	is	behind	




With	 the	 institutional	 distrust	 in	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 being	 so	 fundamentally	 embedded	 into	
consumer’s	mind,	when	consumers	are	talking	about	their	trust	in	tap	water,	the	trustee	is	not	tap	water’s	
quality	but	tap	water’s	manageability.	The	tap	water’s	manageability	can	be	defined	as	consumers’	self-
evaluations	 on	 whether	 they	 can	 treat	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 with	 their	 available	 consumer	 coping	





























Previous	 sections	 have	 outlined	 the	 composition	 of	 ‘source	 to	 sip’	 urban	 potable	 tap	water	 provision	
system.	 Its	 operation	 relies	 on	 two	 essential	 systems:	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 and	 Consumer	
Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	This	section	aims	to	present	the	concept	of	sociogenic	sustainability	water	crisis.	
Given	 the	 Oxford	 Dictionary,	 sociogenic	 is	 defined	 as	 ‘originating	 in	 society	 or	 social	 interaction’ 16	.	



















for	 the	development	of	Hybrid	 Institutional	Architecture.	 It	 is	 the	eruption	of	various	water	crises	that	
















As	 has	 been	 analysed	 in	 section	 3.5.3,	 the	 outbreak	 of	 these	 sociogenic	 sustainability	 crisis	 and	 its	




outbreak	 of	 sociogenic	 sustainability	 crises	 entails	 a	 contingent	 combination	model	 composed	 by	 five	
interconnected	 conditions:	 history	 condition,	 geography	 condition,	 political	 condition,	 environmental	
condition,	and	culture	condition.	This	sociogenic	sustainability	crises	would	trigger	a	series	of	uncontrolled	
















complexity	 of	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 is	 elaborated	 through	 introducing	 the	 concept	 of	 Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture;	the	distinctiveness	and	complexity	of	consumer	reactions	is	elaborated	through	
presenting	 the	 concept	 of	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	 Matrix;	 the	 distinctiveness	 and	 complexity	 of	
consumer’s	 trust	 in	 tap	water	 is	developed	by	highlighting	 the	concept	of	 consumer’s	 institutionalised	
distrust	in	tap	water;	the	distinctiveness	and	complexity	of	water	sustainability	crisis	is	elaborated	through	
revealing	the	concept	of	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis.	
Taking	 all	 these	 distinctiveness	 and	 complexity	 into	 consideration,	 China’s	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	
system	can	be	 seen	as	 the	 combination	of	 two	 systems:	 ‘source	 to	 consumer’	 semi-potable	 tap	water	
provision	system	and	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process.	This	combination	functions	as	
a	 ‘source	 to	 sip’	 urban	 potable	 tap	 water	 provision	 system,	 which,	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	 disguises	 the	












the	 nexus	 of	 power/money/water	 flow	 is	 the	 foundation	 of	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture.	 The	
institutional	incoherency	in	power	flow	can	be	captured	in	three	relationships:	the	relationship	between	
government	 departments	 themselves,	 the	 relationship	 between	 government,	water	 company	 and	 the	
consumer,	and	the	relationship	between	consumer,	third	parties,	and	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	






4.2 The	 grim	 situation	 of	 China's	 fresh	 water	
resources	
China	is	one	of	the	most	water-strapped	countries	in	the	world.	Fresh	water	resources	in	China	is	not	only	































































Figure	 4.4	 demonstrates	 the	 water	 quality	 of	 China’s	 groundwater	 in	 2014.	 There	 was	 a	 significant	
difference	between	ground	water	quality	in	Northern	China	and	Southern	China.	In	Northern	China,	the	
groundwater	quality	was	much	worse	than	it	was	in	Southern	China.	Because	of	the	intermingling	between	
surface	water	and	ground	water,	 86.1%	ground	water	was	 from	surface	water,	which	 implied	 that	 the	
pollutions	in	both	the	groundwater	and	the	surface	water	were	transferable	(Ministry	of	Water	Resource,	
P.	 R.	 China,	 2014).	 Given	 the	 latest	 data	 published	 in	 2016,	 80%	 of	 groundwater	 resources	 has	 been	
polluted	by	 the	 transferred	agriculture	and	 industrial	 pollutant	existing	 in	 the	 surface	water	 resources	
(Shan,	 2016).	 Therefore,	 the	 pollution	 in	major	 rivers	 located	 in	 Northern	 China	 was	 transferred	 into	
groundwater.	The	monitoring	data	of	groundwater	in	the	Northern	17	provinces	showed	that	only	0.5%	of	





























































power/money/water	 nexuses,	 the	 institutional	 incoherencies	 in	 power	 flow	 can	 be	 observed	 in	 three	
types	of	relationships.	In	respect	to	the	relationship	between	government	departments	themselves,	there	
is	an	institutional	incoherency	in	power	flow	of	the	transformation	of	administration	mechanism	and	the	
power	 redistribution	 between	 government	 departments.	 In	 respect	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	
government,	 water	 company	 and	 consumer,	 there	 is	 an	 institutional	 incoherency	 in	 power	 flow	 that	
demonstrates	in	the	water	supply	contract.	In	respect	to	the	relationship	between	consumer,	third	party	











the	 local	 level,	 and	 measures	 published	 by	 them	 are	 always	 inspired	 and	 set	 by	 their	 local	 specific	
conditions.	As	a	contrast,	 legal	documents	issued	by	agents	of	the	first	six	administration	 levels	do	not	










Centring	around	a	nine-level	 legal	and	policy	 framework	of	water	affairs,	 there	are	 five	 types	of	major	
plans	associated	with	urban	tap	water	provision.	These	are	urban	comprehensive	plan,	water	resources	
allocation	plan,	water	resources	use	and	supply	plan,	drought	contingency	plan,	and	water	saving	plan.	















The	 Water	 resources	 Allocation	 Plans	 are	 made	 on	 the	 catchment-based	 river	 basin	 level.	 They	 are	


























Five-Year	 Plan.	 This	 situation,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 demonstrates	 central	 government’s	 determination	 in	
achieving	 the	 goal	 of	 ‘water-saving’	 society.	 However,	 on	 the	 other,	 it	 also	 implicates	 the	 difficulty	 of	
reaching	this	goal.	In	December	2006,	Chinese	Minister	of	Water	resources	(MWR)	published	an	essential	
plan,	Water-Saving	 Society	 Eleventh	 Five-Year	 Plan,	 aiming	 to	 shift	 the	 whole	 society	 from	 the	 water	






























‘The	 State	 shall,	 on	water	 resources,	 adopt	 a	 system	which	 combines	 unified	 administration	with	 the	







them	 by	 the	 people’s	 governments	 at	 the	 corresponding	 level.’	 This	 administration	mode	 had	 caused	









years,	 it	 resulted	 in	3,704	dead,	15	million	homeless	and	26	billion	dollars	of	economic	 loss.	After	 this	
tragedy,	China	entered	 into	 the	epoch	of	 constructing	extensive	 large-scale	hydraulic	 facilities.	 Experts	
from	the	Ministry	of	Water	Resources	Development	Research	Centre	presented	the	following	data	(h2o-




hydropower	plants,	water	 reservoirs,	 and	other	hydraulic	 facilities	have	been	built	 across	 the	 country.	
Between	2010	and	2012,	China’s	central	government	conducted	its	first	national	survey	of	water,	including	
the	survey	of	hydraulic	facilities	(Bulletin	of	First	National	Census	for	Water	(Text	in	Chinese)).	According	






duties	and	powers	of	a	 series	government	departments	 in	1998,	aiming	 to	 transfer	 the	administrative	
power	over	water	resources	from	several	other	departments	to	the	MWR.	This	reform	paved	the	path	for	

































Congress	 organised	 an	 inspection	 over	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	1988	Water	 Law.	 As	 a	 result,	 they	
concluded	 that	 ‘the	 appropriate	 water	 resources	 administration	 mode	 is	 the	 combination	 of	 unified	
administration	 and	 hierarchical	 administration	 but	 not	 departmental	 administration.	 It	 is	 necessary	 to	
constitute	 the	 administration	 structure	 in	 accordance	with	 river	 basin.	 The	 new	 administration	mode	








resources,	 resulting	 in	 the	 power	 conflict.	 The	 2002	 Water	 Law	 clarified	 that	 the	 powers	 of	 other	
government	 departments	 over	 water	 resources	 were	 limited	 in	 the	 scope	 of	 exploration,	 utilisation,	
conservation	and	protection.	
The	2002	Water	Law	confirmed	the	legal	position	of	the	MWR	and	its	sub-department.	Seven	major	sub-
departments	 were	 established	 to	 administrate	 seven	major	 river	 basins:	 Changjiang	Water	 Resources	
Commission;	The	Yellow	River	Conservancy	Commission;	Huaihe	Conservancy	Commission;	Haihe	River	
















its	 power	 to	 municipal	 government	 by	 the	 central	 government,	 still	 keeps	 its	 influences	 through	



















with	 respect	 to	 water	 resources,	 adopt	 a	 system	 which	 combines	 unified	 administration	 with	
administration	at	various	levels	and	by	various	departments’	(Water	Act	of	the	People's	Republic	of	China	








claims	 in	 article	 7	 that	 ‘In	 the	 national	 level,	 the	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 is	 administrated	 by	 the	
construction	 department	 of	 State	 Council;	 In	 provincial	 and	 autonomous	 level,	 the	 urban	 tap	 water	
provision	is	administrated	by	the	construction	department	of	provincial	and	autonomous	government;	In	
municipal	 level,	 the	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 is	 administrated	 by	 the	 urban	 water	 provision	
administrative	department	decided	by	the	local	municipal	governmen’	(translated	by	the	author)	(National	
Urban	Water	Supply	Regulation	(text	in	Chinese)).	From	this	regulation,	this	hierarchy	and	departmental	
administration	 mechanism	 contains	 three	 levels:	 the	 top	 level	 demonstrates	 the	 administration	
mechanism	 of	 central	 government.	 The	 middle	 level	 demonstrates	 the	 administration	 mechanism	 of	
provincial	 government.	 The	 bottom	 level	 demonstrates	 the	 administration	 mechanism	 of	 municipal	
government.	Note	here	that	even	in	municipal	level	the	administrative	department	is	decided	by	the	local	























franchised	public	utility	companies	should	 ‘assume	sole	responsibility	 for	 its	profits	or	 losses’.	Also,	on	
October	30,	2003,	MWR	published	 the	Provisional	Regulation	of	 Investment	 in	Capital	Construction	of	
Water	Conservancy	(Provisional	Regulation	of	Investment	in	Capital	Construction	of	Water	Conservancy	
（Text	 in	 Chinese）).	 In	 its	 article	 5,	 it	 classified	urban	 tap	water	 provision	 as	 one	of	 the	 commercial	
projects	of	water	conservancy.	In	its	article	13,	it	claimed	that	‘the	capital	of	central	government’s	water	
conservancy	 would	 be	 mainly	 invested	 in	 public	 welfare	 and	 semi-public	 welfare	 projects	 of	 water	




example,	 in	1988,	 the	capital	of	 constructing	Huaya	 tap	water	 treatment	plant	 in	Henan	province	was	
partially	 from	 the	 loan	 of	 Canada	 government	 and	 partially	 collected	 by	 the	 local	 municipal	 utility	
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are	 involved	 in	 the	 administration	of	 urban	 tap	water	provision.	 The	 former	has	published	a	 series	of	
significant	 regulations,	 rules,	 and	 standards	 regarding	 the	quality	 of	 tap	water	 (introduced	 in	 detail	 in	
section	 4.5).	 The	 latter	 is	mainly	 in	 charge	of	 the	 protection	of	 the	 environment	 of	 tap	water	 source.	
Meanwhile,	NDRC	and	its	subordinated	departments	in	provincial	and	municipal	level	are	responsible	for	
setting	urban	water	rates.		










Therefore,	 for	 the	 central	 government,	 the	 most	 serious	 problem	 in	 administrating	 urban	 tap	 water	
provision	is	to	reconcile	the	dispersed	flows	of	power	between	‘stripes’	and	‘blocks’.	Given	this	situation,	























first	 time	 made	 a	 strategic	 decision	 to	 ‘reform	 the	 administration	 institution	 of	 the	 water	 resource’	
(Ministry	of	Water	Resource,	P.	R.	China,	2005,	p.1).	As	introduced	in	the	previous	section,	this	reform	was	













MHURD,	 had	 issued	 several	 regulations	 and	 standards.	 Besides,	 the	 National	 Urban	 Water	 Supply	









was	 Shenzhen’s	 political	 reform	 that	 prompted	 the	 MWR	 to	 initiate	 the	 reform	 of	 Integrated	
Administration	of	Water	Affair,	or	 it	was	 the	MWR	who	chose	Shenzhen	as	 the	 first	 city	of	 its	 reform.	
However,	what	can	be	confirmed	is	that	there	are	numerous	political	considerations	behind	this	decision.	
Firstly,	 Deng	 Xiaoping,	 the	most	 significant	 political	 figure,	 and	 the	 ‘the	 architect	 of	 China’s	 economic	
transformation’	in	China	at	that	time,	visited	Shenzhen	city	in	1992	during	his	famous	political	tour,	the	
Southern	Tour	of	China.	This	provided	Shenzhen	the	political	environment	for	reform.	Secondly,	as	the	first	
of	 the	 five	 Special	 Economic	 Zones,	 Shenzhen’s	 innovative	 political	 reforms	 are	more	 acceptable	 and	
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a	milestone	of	marketisation	 reform	of	 urban	public	 utility,	MHURD	published	Opinions	 on	Promoting	
Urban	 Public	 Utility	Marketisation	 Process,	 the	 first	 legal	 document	 in	 China’s	 history	 to	 advance	 the	
franchise	operation	in	urban	public	utility	industry.	Obviously,	the	promotion	of	Integrated	Water	Affair	
Administration	Reform	would,	to	some	extent,	counteract	the	 implementation	of	marketisation	reform	
promoted	 mainly	 by	 MHURD,	 because	 the	 former	 reform	 would	 negatively	 influence	 the	 MHURD’s	
administration	of	 urban	public	 utilities	 in	water	 provision	 system.	Consequently,	 there	 is	 a	 disjunction	
between	the	reform	in	power	flow	and	the	reform	in	money	flow.	
Until	 March	 24,	 2004,	 besides	 Tibet	 Autonomous	 Region,	 52%	 of	 administration	 areas	 in	 China	 has	
established	their	local	MWAB	(Shen	and	Jiang,	2005).	It	seems	like	an	impressive	record.	However,	another	
fact	needs	to	be	emphasised:	since	the	establishment	of	Shenzhen	Municipal	Water	Affair	Bureau	in	1993,	
the	MWR	has	spent	11	years	 in	promoting	this	reform.	This	 low	efficiency	 implicates	the	difficulties	of	
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subordinated	 to	Chongqing	only	 transferred	 the	power	of	administrating	water	 company	 to	 their	 local	




















Second,	 this	 reform	does	not	have	any	support	 from	the	current	 legal	 framework.	The	National	Urban	
Water	 Supply	 Regulation	 was	 still	 valid.	 Until	 today,	 the	 central	 government	 has	 not	 published	 any	
regulations	and	laws	to	support	the	Integrated	Water	Affair	Administration	Reform.	All	of	the	backing	of	
the	reform	is	from	government	notice,	guidance,	decision	and	other	types	of	document.	Many	of	them	
are	 published	by	 the	MWR	 itself.	 In	 2011,	 the	 State	 Council	 published	 the	State	 Council’s	Decision	 on	
Promoting	the	Hydraulic	Reform.	It	claimed	to	‘improve	the	administration	mechanism	of	water	resource’	











given	 the	National	 Urban	Water	 Supply	 Regulation	 they	 should	 subordinate	 to	 the	 administration	 of	
















is	an	 integrated	administration	of	all	water	associated	affairs.	 It	 includes	the	integrated	











Supply	 Sector	Development	and	Technological	 Progress	Plan.	 The	power	 conflict	 over	urban	 tap	water	
supply	seems	to	have	reached	a	stalemate.	















specific	 administration	 responsibilities	 regarding	 urban	 administration	 to	 municipal	 government,	 who	
shall	decide	the	administration	mechanism	on	municipal	public	utilities,	afforestation,	water	supplying,	
sewage,	waste	water	treatment’	(Notice	of	the	General	Office	of	the	State	Council	on	Issuing	the	Provisions	
on	 the	 Main	 Functions,	 Internal	 Bodies	 and	 Staffing	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Housing	 and	 Urban-Rural	
Development	（Text	 in	Chinese),	p.1).	Both	notices	have	clearly	described	the	power	that	needs	to	be	
handed	over,	which	highlighted	the	central	government’s	determination	in	promoting	this	reform.	Both	
MWR	 and	MHURD	 now	 only	 have	 the	 power	 to	 offer	 guidance	 on	municipal	water	 affairs.	Municipal	
government	becomes	the	only	administrator	of	municipal	water	affairs.		
In	this	reform,	the	MH	keeps	its	power	of	supervising	the	quality	of	tap	water,	but	has	to	hand	over	the	
power	 of	 evaluating	 the	 technology	of	 products	 associated	with	 tap	water,	 domestic	water	 treatment	
equipment	 and	 other	 new	 material	 and	 chemical	 compound	 in	 touch	 with	 tap	 water	 to	 the	 public	
institutions	 (Notice	 of	 the	 General	 Office	 of	 the	 State	 Council	 on	 Issuing	 the	 Provisions	 on	 the	Main	










As	 Figure	 4.9	 shows,	 compared	 to	 the	 hierarchy	 and	 departmental	 administration	mechanism	 before	










system	of	MWAB	 in	provincial	 level.	 This	 level	 is	 the	mediation	 level	between	 the	municipal	 level	 and	
national	level.	Taking	into	account	the	dynamic	of	inertia	of	hierarchy	and	departmental	administration	
mechanism,	 if	 central	 government	 bestows	 the	 administration	 power	 of	 municipal	 water	 affairs	 to	







Third,	 this	 reform	 paves	 the	 way	 for	 promoting	 the	 marketisation	 of	 urban	 public	 utility.	 With	 the	
centralised	administration	power,	the	municipal	government	now	is	capable	of	attracting	private	capital	
to	 invest	 in	 tap	water	 supply	 system	and	 sewage	 treatment	 system.	 In	 fact,	 in	 the	 interview	with	 the	
investment	 officer	 of	 BEWG,	 he	 admitted	 that	 private	 capital	 is	more	 interested	 in	 sewage	 treatment	
system	than	tap	water	supply	system.	
However,	 the	Super-Ministry	Reform	also	 transferred	many	problems	 from	 the	national	 and	provincial	
level	 to	 the	 municipal	 level.	 It	 is	 now	 municipal	 government’s	 responsibility	 to	 answer	 the	 difficult	
questions	as	followed:	how	to	deal	with	the	problem	of	departmental	interests	in	the	process	of	promoting	
Integrated	Water	Affair	 Administration	Reform?	How	 to	 differentiate	 the	 ‘guidance’	 from	 the	 superior	










the	Ministry	 of	Water	 Resources	（Text	 in	 Chinese),	 p.3).	 Here,	 the	 power	 boundary	 between	 water	
resources	protection,	water	environment	quality,	and	water	pollution	control	is	ambiguous.	When	water	





share	 the	 same	 goal:	 they	 all	 try	 to	 redistribute	 the	 power	 from	 construction	 department	 to	 other	
departments,	either	water	resources	department	or	municipal	government.	What	is	behind	this	process	
is	 the	 fact	 that	 administration	 mechanism	 has	 been	 transformed	 from	 hierarchy	 and	 departmental	
administration	mechanism	to	integrated	administration	mechanism.	In	the	second	reform,	the	power	is	




impose	 its	 influence	on	urban	water	affairs.	Moreover,	 as	will	 be	highlighted	 in	 section	4.4.2,	MHURD	




Meanwhile,	 in	 respect	 to	 the	 administration	of	water	 source,	 the	MEP	 and	 the	MWR	now	has	 a	 new	
institutional	 incoherency.	These	two	institutional	 incoherencies	reveal	an	essential	weakness	of	China’s	










the	 institutional	 incoherency	 in	 power	 flow	 in	 China’s	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system.	 To	 further	
illustrate	this	incoherency,	it	is	worthwhile	to	examine	China’s	urban	water	supply	contract.	





In	 this	balance,	both	 sides	have	 the	 certain	power	 to	 influence	 the	other’s	behaviours.	Accompanying	
these	influences,	the	money	can	flow	from	the	consumer	to	the	water	company	as	either	water	rates	or	
fines,	or	from	water	company	to	consumer	as	the	compensation	for	inconsistent	water	supply.	In	some	




Although	 it	 is	 a	 crucial	 component	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	water	 company	 and	 consumer,	 in	
China’s	academia,	the	study	of	water	supply	contract	is	absent	for	long	time.	Given	the	searching	result	in	
China	National	 Knowledge	 Infrastructure23	(CNKI),	 the	 largest	 academic	 publication	 database	 in	 China,	
only	a	handful	papers	regarding	tap	water	supply	contract	have	been	published.	Such	neglect	is	another	
piece	of	evidence	reflecting	the	dominance	of	physical	and	managerial	research	on	water	affairs	in	China	









template	 triggered	 the	 conflict	 between	 Beijing	 Waterworks	 Group	 (BWG)	 and	 Beijing	 Consumer	
Association	(BCA).	In	2001,	the	BCA	delivered	their	critical	opinions	through	pointing	out	five	problems	in	






















that	 it	 is	 still	 by	and	 large	 command-driven,	even	 though	 it	may	not	be	as	direct	 as	 it	was	before	 the	
marketisation	reform	of	urban	public	utility	(introduced	in	section	4.4.2).	For	instance,	water	companies	
have	to	undertake	the	supervision	of	at	 least	 five	government	departments:	 the	MWAB,	which	 is	 their	
direct	 superior;	 the	MEPB,	which	monitors	 the	quality	 of	water	 source;	 the	MHB,	which	oversees	 the	
quality	of	 tap	water;	 the	MCHURB,	which,	 in	some	cities,	supervises	 the	operation	of	water	 treatment	
plants	and	pipeline;	and	the	PDRC,	which	is	in	charge	of	the	modification	of	water	rate.	Thus,	although	the	
water	companies	can	enjoy	a	certain	degree	of	independence	as	being	an	independent	company,	they	still	
















a	 defining	 characteristic	 of	 governmental	 department	 rather	 than	 a	 commercial	 entity.	 Thus,	 few	
consumers	can	distinguish	the	business	characteristic	from	governmental	characteristic.	Such	a	confusion	




First,	 in	China’s	academia,	 little	attention	has	been	paid	to	the	theoretical	analysis	of	 individual’s	water	
right.	Most	of	the	discussions	around	water	right	are	predicated	on	a	national,	provincial	and	municipal	


















confusion	makes	 the	 water	 company	 rely	more	 on	 the	 government.	 On	 the	 other,	 even	 if	 the	 water	
company	triggers	some	troubles,	the	government	can	easily	escape	from	taking	responsibilities	by	claiming	
that	the	water	company	is	an	independent	commercial	entity.		






In	 sum,	 this	 confusion	 strengthens	 consumers’	 powerlessness	 in	 their	 relationship	 with	 the	 Hybrid	
Institutional	 Architecture.	 The	 monopoly	 of	 water	 company	 means	 that	 consumers	 cannot	 have	
alternative	access	to	water	if	they	refuse	to	sign	their	name	on	the	water	supply	contract.	In	other	words,	
even	 being	 conditioned	 by	 a	 series	 of	 water	 resources	 and	 provision	 management	 regulations,	
monopolisation	has	bestowed	a	dramatic	bargaining	power	to	the	water	company.	Consumers	have	no	








































work	 are	 not	 available	 to	 the	 public.	 As	 for	 industrial	 associations,	 they	 receive	political	 and	 financial	

























were	 (Article	 7).	 These	NGOs	 also	 have	 to	 be	managed	 by	 the	 ‘related	 agencies’	 on	 the	 national	 and	
provincial	 level	 (Article	 7).	 Permission	 for	 all	 their	 temporary	 activities	 has	 to	 be	 granted	 by	 their	
supervisory	agencies	unless	they	are	labeled	as	China’s	official	cooperative	NGOs	(Article	19).	Besides	the	
restricted	government	regulations,	oversees	NGOs	face	other	problems	as	well.	Even	though	many	NGOs	





The	situation	of	 local	 tap	water	NGOs	 is	much	more	complicated.	For	example,	 in	 the	 interview	of	Liu	
Chunlei,	 the	 founder	 and	 leader	 of	 Qingyun	 Environmental	 Information	 Technology	 Service	 Centre	

























looking	up	 the	 title	of	 this	 report	 in	 article	 content,	Baidu	 shows	 three	 results,	 the	 first	one	 is	 from	a	


















by	 two	 charities,	 both	 of	which	 have	 certain	 commercial	 backgrounds,	 one	 is	 from	e-commerce	 giant	
Alibaba	and	another	is	from	Beijing	Entrepreneur	Environmental	Protection	Foundation.		
Taken	together,	these	results	highlight	the	reciprocal	causation	of	the	problems	for	NGOs	and	tap	water	





which	 in	 turn	 triggers	 the	 inadequate	 money	 and	 information	 circulation.	 The	 power	 of	 managing	
environmental	issues	is	still	centralised	in	the	hands	of	the	government,	who	is	unwilling	to	share	it	with	
other	organisations.	As	pointed	out	by	 a	Chinese	expert,	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	propaganda	of	 ‘public	
participation’,	 there	 is	 a	 cognitive	 dissonance	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	 NGOs:	 from	 the	
















uncommitted	 to	 the	 public	 issue	 of	 tap	 water.	 This	 has	 significantly	 undermined	 their	 capacities	 in	
connecting	 themselves	 with	 the	 tap	 water	 consumer,	 pushing	 them	 gradually	 to	 embrace	 the	
government’s	and	market’s	positions.	
In	 an	 interview	 with	 a	 staff	 member	 of	 the	 Drinking	 Healthy	 Committee	 of	 China	 National	 Health	
Association	 (DHCCNHA),	 an	 Industrial	 Non-profit	 Social	 Association	 subordinate	 to	 the	 China	National	
Health	Association,	which	is	directly	regulated	by	the	MH,	the	interviewee	clarified	that	the	constitution	

























are	especially	vulnerable	 in	 the	 face	of	 these	decreases.	Many	elderly	members	of	 the	
public,	suffering	from	deformed	joints,	have	drunk	such	water	for	their	whole	lives.	It	is	
the	 government’s	 obligation	 to	 guarantee	 them	 the	 healthiest	 water.	 The	MH	 always	
claimed	that	they	want	to	do	something	to	amend	the	water	condition	in	rural	areas,	but	




From	 this	 description,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 the	 Industrial	 Association	 here	 has	 functioned	 as	 an	
intermediator	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	 market.	 It	 becomes	 a	 consulting	 platform	 that	 can	
organise	the	resources	from	different	market	actors	and	connect	them	with	the	government	projects.		
Functioning	as	an	intermediator,	the	DHCCNHA	also	shares	some	power	with	the	government.	For	example,	












his/her	 words,	 ‘since	 many	 employees	 who	 deliver	 barrelled	 water	 are	 not	 well	 educated,	 […]	 the	
DHCCNHA	established	a	special	school	for	to	inform	them	about	industrial	and	sanitary	standards.’		
To	conclude,	 from	the	perspective	of	power	circulation,	 the	 tap	water	 Industrial	Associations	does	not	
receive	much	extra	power	from	the	government,	especially	given	that	they	have	been	officially	separated	
from	 the	 government	 systems.	 However,	 compared	 to	 NGOs,	 their	 position	 is	 much	 closer	 to	 the	















were	 extensive	 online	 promotion	 campaigns	 for	 this	 project,	 especially	 in	 March	 2016	 when	 the	
publication	of	 this	book	was	announced.	Given	 these	promotion	campaigns,	 this	project	has	 collected	
hundreds	of	thousands	validated	questionnaires	about	tap	water.	In	Baidu	News	Search	the	relevant	news	
can	be	seen	in	dozens	of	mainstream	websites.	In	reference	to	the	news	reports,	this	project	was	hosted	
by	 government	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 Regulation	 Committee	 of	 Jilin	 Changbaishan	 Conservation	
Developing	Zone	and	the	Baishan	Municipal	Government,	and	People’s	Government	of	Antu	County	of	






the	 investigation	 and	data	 analysis	 of	 the	book	 project;	 and	 secondly,	 the	 Kaidi	Data	 Research	Centre	




















Compared	 with	 the	 QEITSC’s	 case,	 five	 points	 of	 difference	 can	 be	 highlighted.	 Firstly,	 there	 was	 a	
differentiation	in	focus	point.	QEITSC	focused	on	the	systematic	flaws	of	the	tap	water	provision	system,	
whereas	 DHCCNHA	 focused	 on	 the	 marketing	 of	 tap	 water	 production.	 Secondly,	 there	 was	 a	












QEITSC,	 their	 investigation	 was	 not	 widely	 publicized	 in	 the	 media,	 and	 given	 the	 concern	 regarding	
financial	and	public	support,	their	investigation’s	scope	was	limited.	For	the	DHCCNHA,	their	investigation	






into	 a	 powerful	 association	 that	 attracted	 representatives	 from	ninety	 parishes	who	 represented	 1.25	
million	people,	played	a	pivotal	role	in	not	only	connecting	water	consumers,	mostly	middle-class	citizens,	
and	the	government,	but	also	integrating	the	former	into	the	administration	of	tap	water	provision	system	
with	 the	 latter	 in	 1855	 (Trentmann	 and	 Taylor,	 2005).	Moreover,	 during	 this	 process	 of	 connecting,	 it	





the	 tap	 water	 consumer	 and	 the	 government,	 particularly	 regarding	 supervising	 tap	 water	 data	 and	





Furthermore,	 NDRC	 (Guidance	 on	 experimental	work	 of	water	 rates	 cost	 disclosure	 (Text	 in	 Chinese))	
published	 a	 legal	 document	 to	 promote	 the	 disclosure	 and	 supervision	 of	 the	 urban	 tap	 water	 rates	
adjustment,	the	Guidance	on	Experimental	Work	of	Water	Rates	Cost	Disclosure.	However,	no	NGOs	and	








Without	 the	 effective	 contribution	 of	 NGOs	 and	 Industrial	 Associations,	 the	 cooperation	 mechanism	
between	government	and	tap	water	consumer	is	paralysed.	As	a	result	of	this	situation,	even	though	the	
government	 may	 have	 disclosed	 the	 information	 regarding	 tap	 water	 affairs	 and	 advocated	 public	




In	 sum,	 from	 the	 analysis	 above,	 currently,	 in	 China	 the	 ‘third	 party’	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 dysfunctional	






























Although	tap	water	rates	 is	 important	for	both	social	and	 industrial	development,	 its	relevant	research	





















































in	China.	NDRC	request	 local	municipal	governments	 to	supervise	 the	correlation	between	water	 rates	
with	the	CPI	so	as	to	prevent	any	CPI	increase	led	by	water	rates	increase.	From	2009	onward,	owing	to	





price.	 The	 volume	 price	 is	 measured	 by	 the	 value	 of	 the	 fixed	 assets	 of	 local	 water	 companies.	 The	











the	 consideration	 of	 special	 requirements	 of	 some	 businesses,	 such	 as	 car-washing,	 SPA	 and	 golfing	











the	 special	 situation	of	every	province,	 city	and	county.	 Fifth,	numerous	 invisible	political	 factors	have	
imposed	 their	 influences	 on	 the	 adjustment	 of	 tap	 water	 rate,	 such	 as	 political	 events,	 personnel	
arrangement,	and	capital	attraction	policy.	Sixth,	since	the	tap	water	rates	has	been	kept	at	a	low	level	for	


























As	 Figure	 4.10	 shows,	 on	 January	 1	 2011,	 another	 two	 administration	 documents	 regarding	 public	























In	 the	 context	 of	 uneven	water	 resources	 storage	 and	 distribution,	 the	marketization	 reform	 in	water	
industry	 initiated	 in	 1990s.	Qin	Hong	and	Qian	Pu	 (2008)	 classified	 the	development	of	 China’s	 urban	












In	 the	 second	 period,	 water	 companies	 attempted	 to	 separate	 from	 the	 government	 departmental	








franchise	 system.	 In	 March	 2003,	 the	 Third	 Plenary	 Session	 of	 the	 16th	 Central	 Committee	 of	 the	
Communist	Party	of	China	made	the	official	decision	to	promote	the	marketization	of	urban	public	utility.	
On	19	March	2004,	MHURD	published	the	Franchise	Operation	Measure	of	Urban	Public	Utilities,	which	
further	 strengthened	 the	 implementation	 of	 franchise	 operation	 in	 urban	 public	 utilities.	 Later	 on	 12	
August,	the	State	Council	published	the	Several	Opinions	of	the	State	Council	on	Encouraging,	Supporting	










separated	 by	 private	 companies	 that	 claimed	 to	 deliver	 a	 more	 efficient	 service.	 Meanwhile,	 water	
companies	 as	 SOE	 began	 to	 try	 to	 transform	 their	 characteristics	 from	 the	 hybrid	 of	 government	














BEWG	 introduces	 itself	 as	 ‘a	 large-scale	 group	 that	 provides	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 water	 services	 and	
environmental	protection	services	in	China’.30	It	is	subordinated	to	the	Beijing	Enterprises	Holdings	Limited	












interview	with	 the	 investment	 officer	 of	 BEWG,	 he/she	 admitted	 that	 the	 focus	 of	most	water	 utility	
companies	in	China	is	‘water	treatment	instead	of	water	distribution	and	water	provision’.	As	the	China’s	








given	 their	 public	 utility	 characteristic,	 they	 also	 have	 to	 be	monitored	 by	 a	 government	 department,	




































With	 the	 problematic	marketization	 reform	of	 urban	 public	 utility,	 some	 political	 cautiousness	 on	 the	
development	 of	 franchise	 operation	 in	 urban	 public	 utility	 has	 been	 highlighted	 in	 some	 government	
documents.	On	10	September	2005,	MHURD	published	another	document,	the	Opinions	on	Strengthening	
the	Regulation	of	Municipal	Public	Utilities.	It	stresses	that	the	public	water	service	was	an	important	part	
of	 public	 welfare.	 Thus	 the	 marketization	 reform	 should	 not	 replace	 the	 responsibility	 of	 municipal	
government.	It	also	highlighted	the	importance	of	public	participation.	Other	documents	emphasised	the	
increased	 quality	 of	 tap	 water	 provision	 and	 the	 enforced	 monitoring	 system.	 However,	 even	 the	
information	of	public	participation	and	water	quality	monitoring	was	published	both	online	and	offline,	




such	 reform	 only	 covers	 certain	 sections	 in	 the	 whole	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system.	 With	 the	
disconnection	between	money	flow	and	water	flow,	and	with	the	water	rates	being	fixed	at	a	certain	level,	












publication	 of	 the	 new	 national	 tap	 water	 standard,	 even	 citizens	 of	 Beijing	 and	 Shanghai,	 the	 most	




studies	 have	 investigated	 and	 delineated	 the	 development	 of	 China’s	 tap	 water	 standard	 from	 the	





The	 three	 government	 administration	 reforms	 (introduced	 in	 section	 4.3.3)	 failed	 in	 taking	 the	water	
standards	into	consideration,	resulting	in	the	fact	that	the	power	of	producing	and	implementing	water	
standards	 is	 dispersed	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 different	 ministries,	 causing	 a	 series	 of	 administration	 and	
cooperation	problems.	In	this	sense,	the	flow	of	power	and	money	is	circulating	in	the	urban	tap	water	













in	certain	administrative	regions	 in	the	absence	of	National	and	Industrial	Standard.	The	fourth	 level	 is	




power	 of	 compulsory	 standard	 outweighs	 the	 power	 of	 recommend	 standard.	 The	 water	 standards	
discussed	in	this	section	are	all	from	the	first	two	levels	of	the	four-level	standard	system.	
In	 September	 1927,	 Shanghai	 published	 the	 first	 tap	water	 standard	 in	 China,	 the	Water	 Standard	 of	
Shanghai	City.	This	 standard	 included	21	 indices	 in	 the	beginning.	One	year	 later,	 it	added	coliform	as	










Collective	 Water	 Source	 and	 Water	 Quality	 Evaluation.	 However,	 this	 regulation	 did	 not	 clarify	 the	








under	 their	 separate	names	until	 2006.	 In	1988,	 the	State	 Infrastructure	Commission	was	 replaced	by	
Ministry	of	Construction	(MC),	the	predecessor	of	MHURD.	In	the	Super-Ministry	Reform	in	2008,	MC	was	
replaced	 by	 MHURD,	 but	 it	 is	 still	 in	 charge	 of	 setting	 tap	 water	 standards,	 especially	 for	 standards	
regarding	water	treatment	plants.	
In	October	 1985,	 the	MH	published	 its	 first	National	 Compulsory	 Standard,	 the	Standard	 for	Drinking	







and	MC:	 the	 power	 of	 the	 former	 has	 overshadowed	 the	 power	 of	 later	 in	 tap	water	 administration.	
However,	in	November	1992,	MC	published	a	plan	named	Urban	Water	Supply	Sector	Development	and	
Technological	Progress	Plan	In	2000.	In	this	plan,	it	asked	first-class34	water	companies	to	follow	88	water	
quality	 indices,	 second-class	 water	 companies	 to	 follow	 51	 indices	 and	 third	 and	 fourth-class	 water	
companies	 to	 follow	 35	 indices.	 The	 publication	 of	 this	 plan	 demonstrates	 that	 MC	 was	 trying	 to	
strengthen	 its	 power	 through	 publishing	 industrial	 standards	 that	 overlapped	 with	 MH’s	 universal	








its	 classification,	 its	 limits,	 its	 quality	 testing	 and	 its	monitoring.	 It	 is	 obvious	 here	 that	 this	 standard	
overlapped	with	the	MH’s	national	tap	water	standard	in	respect	to	tap	water	source	regulation.		
The	publication	of	this	standard	once	again	highlights	the	institutional	incoherency	in	power	flow	between	
government	 departments.	Moreover,	MC	was	 trying	 to	 achieve	 new	 power	 through	 publishing	water	
standard	on	potable	water.	On	28	September	1999,	MC	published	an	Industrial	Compulsory	Standard,	the	
Water	Quality	Standards	 for	Fine	Water.	 This	 is	 the	 first	 standard	 for	potable	water	and	 its	associated	




its	 actions.	 In	 2000,	 it	 tried	 to	 revise	 the	 1985	 national	 tap	 water	 standard	 through	 holding	





62	 indices	 are	 irregular	 test	 indices,	 and	 many	 health	 monitor	 centres	 even	 did	 not	 equip	 with	 the	















the	 predecessor	 of	 Ministry	 of	 Land	 and	 Resources	 (MLR),	 published	 the	 first	 and	 the	 only	 National	
Recommended	Standard	of	ground	water	quality,	 the	Quality	Standard	 for	Ground	Water.	 Today,	even	



























and	heavy	metal	 ion	pollutants	 in	2006.	As	a	 result,	59	out	of	71	new	 indices	are	 toxicity	 indices.	The	
number	 of	 organic	 pollutant	 indices,	 such	 as	 CODMn,	 has	 been	 expanded	 from	 5	 to	 53.	 11	 inorganic	





























published	 two	 recommended	 technical	 guidelines	 about	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 tap	water	 source.	 This	
evidenced	the	fact	that	without	enough	power,	MEP’s	work	is	 limited	in	pollution	control.	 It	cannot	be	
integrated	into	the	water	source	protection	effectively.	On	January	1	2014,	the	MWR	published	its	first	
and	 only	 plan	 about	water	 source,	 Guidelines	 for	 Urban	Water	 Supply	 Sources	 Plan.	 Since	 they	 both	




existing	 institutional	 incoherencies	 in	 power,	 money	 and	 water	 flow	 respectively.	 Their	 circulation	
between	the	different	agents	in	the	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	
forms	 the	 foundation	 of	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture.	 In	 order	 to	 illustrate	 the	 institutional	




company	 and	 consumer,	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	 consumer,	 third	 party	 and	Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture.	In	order	to	illustrate	the	institutional	incoherency	in	money	flow,	this	chapter	analysed	the	
composition	of	China’s	water	rates	and	the	ineffective	marketization	reform	of	urban	public	utility.	Finally,	












As	Figure	5.1	shows,	Harbin	 is	 the	capital	city	of	Heilongjiang	Province.	 In	2010	 its	population	reached	
10,635,971,	making	it	one	of	the	most	populous	cities	in	China.	However,	its	water	resources	per	capital	



























Before	moving	 into	 the	phase	of	modern	 tap	water	 supply,	Harbin’s	urban	 tap	water	provision	 system	
experienced	 three	main	developmental	 phases:	 the	phase	of	well	water	 supply	 (960-1932),	 combined	
water	supply	(1932-1953),	and	primary	modern	tap	water	supply	(1953-1980).	This	historical	trajectory	
has	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 people’s	 social	 memory	 about	 water,	 which	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	
constitution	of	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	of	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system	that	supplies	
semi-potable	 tap	water	 to	 the	 consumer,	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix	 in	
dealing	with	the	semi-potable	tap	water.		
In	the	first	two	developmental	phases	of	Harbin’s	tap	water	provision	system,	two	special	technological	
transitions	 can	 be	observed.	 They	 are	 special	 due	 to	 four	 characteristics.	 First,	 they	were	 both	 led	 by	
exogenous	 drivers,	 that	 is,	 the	 Russian	 and	 Japanese	 colonists.	 Second,	 the	 flow	 of	 power	 that	 was	
associated	with	 these	 two	 technological	 transitions	 did	 not	 serve	 the	majority,	 but	 rather	 the	 specific	

















business	 power,	which	 formed	 a	 social	memory	 that	 it	 is	 always	 the	 government	 but	 any	 commercial	
entities	 that	 operate	 the	 tap	 water	 provision	 system.	 	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 Hybrid	








In	Harbin,	 for	 hundreds	 of	 years,	well	water	was	 the	 sole	water	 source	 for	most	 citizens.	 The	 earliest	
records	 of	well	 water	 supply	were	 acquired	 from	 the	 ancient	 city	 ruins	 dated	 back	 to	 the	 early	 Song	
Dynasty	 (960-1276).	 In	 1115,	 Harbin	was	 chosen	 as	 the	 capital	 city	 of	 Jin	 Dynasty,	 a	minority	 regime	
composed	mainly	of	the	Jurchen	ethnic	group	(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	1999).	Several	well	relics	
evidenced	 the	 usage	 of	well	water.	Meanwhile,	 it	 is	 highly	 possible	 that	 a	 few	 people	 living	 near	 the	























the	 19th	 century,	 the	 Guangxu	 Emperor,	 the	 eleventh	 emperor	 of	 the	 Qing	 dynasty,	 abolished	 the	
apartheid	decree	and	facilitated	a	mass	migration	to	the	Northeast	of	China,	historically	called	‘Chuang	
Guan	Dong	(Rush	of	Northeast	China).	Until	the	end	of	the	19th	century,	there	were	30,000	people	living	






















by	 foreigners.	 Predictably,	 many	 had	 doubts	 about	 it.	 However,	 their	 doubts	 were	 either	 ignored	 or	
repressed	 by	 the	 Russian	 colonists,	 yet	 when	 it	 came	 to	 developing	 the	 tap	 water	 business,	 those	
oppositions	had	a	significant	impact.	For	example,	in	1916,	a	businessman	from	Tianjin,	the	first	city	in	
China	 to	be	equipped	with	modern	 tap	water	 facilities,	 came	to	Harbin	with	a	goal	of	 raising	 funds	 to	
initiate	 the	 local	 tap	water	 provision	business	 (Harbin	Municipal	Government,	 1998a).	 This	 is	 the	 first	








the	Middle	 East	 Railway	 launched	 the	 first	 census	 of	 Harbin.	 The	 figures	 showed	 that	 its	 population	
consisted	 of	 28,228	 Chinese,	 15,579	 Russians	 and	 462	 Japanese,	 and	 200	 representatives	 of	 other	
countries	(Li,	2000).	In	1917,	the	population	of	Harbin	reached	100,000,	only	11.5%	of	whom	were	born	
locally	(Bakich,	2000).	It	was	impossible	for	people	from	such	different	backgrounds	to	form	a	centralised	






















From	 1936	 to	 1945,	 several	 tap	 water	 facilities	 had	 been	 constructed	 and	 launched	 by	 the	 Japanese	
colonial	government.	According	to	the	records	from	the	Municipal	Record	Book,	 in	1934,	the	Japanese	
colonial	 government	 established	 the	 Urban	 Construction	 Bureau,	 within	 which	 there	 was	 an	 agency	
responsible	 for	 administering	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision.	 The	 first	 urban	 tap	 water	 source	 project,	





























development	 of	 tap	 water	 provision	 system,	 people	 in	 Taiwan	 accepted	 the	 new	 technology.	 This	
difference	may	partially	be	attributed	to	the	relative	long-term	ruling	of	the	Japanese	colonial	government,	
which	was	from	the	end	of	the	19th	century	until	1945.	During	this	process,	despite	a	brutal	genocide	
implemented	by	 the	 Japanese	army	to	 the	aboriginal	 inhabitants	aimed	at	seizing	 local	water	sources,	
many	average	people,	especially	children,	were	educated	in	school	on	the	concept	of	modern	tap	water	
and	showed	their	support	for	it.	In	Taiwan,	there	is	a	memorial	and	a	statue	for	Yoichi	Hatta,	a	Japanese	
engineer	who	 contributed	 to	 the	 development	 of	 hydraulic	 engineering	 in	 Taiwan	 during	 the	 colonial	
period.	 However,	 in	 Harbin,	 the	 impacts	 of	 technological	 transitions	 are	 essential	 only	 regarding	
constructing	 water-associated	 infrastructures	 and	 facilities.	 The	 benefits	 of	 the	 modern	 tap	 water	
provision	system	were	neither	visible	nor	accessible	to	the	majority.	
On	28	April	1946,	The	CPC’s	Army	retook	Harbin.	One	of	their	prioritized	tasks	was	to	restore	the	urban	
water	 supply	 system.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 this	 year,	 The	 CPC’s	 Harbin	Municipal	 Government	 took	 over	 the	
severely	damaged	water	treatment	plants	and	the	pipeline.	Due	to	the	shortage	of	funding,	the	colonial	








increased	 from	5,000	 cubic	meters	 per	day	 in	 the	war	period	 to	 20,000	 cubic	meters	 per	day	 (Harbin	
Municipal	Government,	1998b).		
5.2.3 The	phase	of	primary	modern	tap	water	supply	(1953-1980)	
After	 the	 founding	 of	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 China	 on	 1	 October,	 1949,	 the	 Harbin’s	 municipal	
government	made	a	decision	to	increase	the	urban	water	supply	capacity.	In	1953,	the	Harbin’s	municipal	
government	 published	 the	 first	 Urban	 Long-term	 General	 Plan,	 including	 the	 first	 Urban	 Water	
Management	 Guidelines.	 From	 then	 on	 until	 1965,	 they	 launched	 several	 water	 projects,	 including	 a	
construction	project	 to	build	 a	new	water	 treatment	plant,	 The	 Second	Water	 Treatment	Plant,	 and	a	
pipeline	expansion	project	aiming	to	expand	the	pipeline	from	150	kilometres	to	407	kilometres.	All	of	









of	 tap	 water	 deteriorated.	 Consequently,	 it	 could	 not	 be	 considered	 as	 ‘potable	 water’	 at	 all	 by	 its	
consumers.	

















rate	 of	 9%.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 1960,	Harbin’s	 population	 topped	 2	million	 (Harbin	Municipal	Government,	
1998b).	


















water	 supply	 booths	 was	 0.007	 Yuan	 per	 40	 kilograms.	 It	 was	 adjusted	 in	 the	 period	 of	 the	 Cultural	
Revolution	 to	an	extremely	 low	rate,	0.05	Yuan	per	person	per	month.	Predictably,	 the	monthly	water	
consumption	amount	doubled	after	the	adjustment.	Meanwhile,	the	service	rates	decreased	from	8	Yuan	












at	 that	 time,	given	that	Harbin	was	seen	as	one	of	 the	most	essential	 industrial	cities	 in	north-eastern	





























consumption	 reached	 41,860,000	 tons	 per	 day,	 consumed	 by	 1.47	 million	 people,	 72%	 of	 urban’s	





and	 economic	 turbulence	 (Sultana	 and	 Loftus,	 2012;	 Harvey,	 2015).	 Three	 short-term	 technological	
transitions	 have	 brought	 out	 the	 rapid	 development	 in	 the	 technology	 of	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision.	
However,	 all	 of	 them	have	 their	 problems.	 The	 first	 two	 technological	 transitions	were	 driven	 by	 two	
different	exogenous	powers	with	their	certain	political	and	economic	 interests.	The	third	technological	






Because	 of	 these	 short-term	 technological	 transitions,	 the	 government	 barely	 had	 any	 experience	 of	
administering	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	As	a	result,	three	disjunctions	can	be	observed:	the	
first	disjunction	is	between	the	urban	plan	and	the	phenomenal	growth	of	urban	population;	the	second	










































eastern	 terrains,	 117	 meters.	 The	 city’s	 uneven	 terrain	 dramatically	 increased	 the	 cost	 of	 pipeline	
construction.	Second,	water	treatment	plants	and	equipment	was	over-concentrated	in	only	one	water	
treatment	plant,	Shamantun	Water	Treatment	Plant.	It	handled	80%	of	urban	water	supply	and	74%	of	
















































1987,	 p.309)	 ,	 ‘Harbin’s	water	 supply	 departments	 are	 composed	 of	municipal	water	 company	 (80%),	
enterprises,	government	departments,	schools	(all	three	of	them	occupied	19%),	and	residents	(1%).’	Here,	





















tap	 water	 distribution	 had	 developed	 rapidly	 with	 the	 tacit	 encouragement	 from	 the	 municipal	
government,	which	tried	to	integrate	this	coping	strategy	into	its	overall	urban	plan.	Here,	it	is	important	
to	note	three	characteristics	of	this	coping	strategy:	First,	it	was	by	nature	an	illegal	private	appropriation	
of	 the	public	water	 resource.	 Second,	 its	 construction	 involved	 the	 tap	water	 consumer,	 the	 industrial	
facilities,	and	the	municipal	government.	The	other	important	agent,	especially	the	market,	did	not	have	
a	significant	 involvement.	This	forms	a	sharp	comparison	with	the	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	that	
will	be	 introduced	 in	the	next	section,	 the	bottled	water	and	barrelled	water.	Third,	 in	 this	period,	 the	
power	and	responsibility	had	been	shifted	from	the	municipal	government	to	the	consumers.	However,	
such	a	shift	did	not	happen	in	the	other	coping	strategy.	Also,	from	the	anthropological	stance,	this	coping	

























from	 1980	 to	 2000.	 This	 means	 that	 such	 prediction	 did	 not	 take	 into	 account	 any	 essential	 factors	
including	population	growth,	urban	expansion,	industrial	development,	environmental	protection,	water	
resources	administration,	and	so	on.	The	municipal	government	had	no	plans	for	either	charging	water	
















Given	 the	 data	 from	 the	 Harbin	 Statistic	 Yearbook,	 in	 1985,	 the	 percentage	 of	 Harbin’s	 water-served	
population	was	78%.	Just	one	year	later,	it	suddenly	reached	98%.	However,	in	the	Harbin	Yearbook,	the	













that	 through	 the	 refurbishment	of	an	old	pipeline,	7909	 families	were	connected	 to	 tap	water	 supply,	
which	increased	the	percentage	of	Harbin’s	water-served	population	by	3%.	Neither	of	these	records	can	
explain	the	dramatic	growth	in	the	percentage	of	the	water-served	population	from	78%	to	98%	reported	












































Figure	5.3	 and	Figure	5.4	demonstrate	 several	 features	of	China’s	water	 resources	management.	 First,	
there	 is	 a	 top-down	 model	 of	 water	 administration.	 This	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 central	 and	 local	
government	 constituted	 a	 flexible	 responsibility	 distribution	 system.	 The	 regulations	 published	 by	 the	
central	government	perform	as	both	the	principle	and	the	guidance	for	the	regulations	published	by	the	
local	 government,	 whose	 responsibility	 is	 to	 elaborate	 these	 principles	 and	 guidance	 into	 details.	
Meanwhile,	the	local	government	can	either	adjust	or	abolish	their	regulations	more	often	than	the	central	













water	 resource.	 This	 regulation	 was	 later	 replaced	 by	 Regulations	 on	 the	 Administration	 of	 Water	


























time	when	 this	 idea	was	proposed,	 the	Harbin’s	municipal	government	was	not	 fully	prepared	 to	 take	
effective	control	of	its	groundwater	consumption.	The	local	government	needs	time	to	adjust	the	water	

















administration,	 the	extraction	volume	decreased	to	120,000	cubic	meters	per	day	 (Li,	2012).	The	 long-





























water	 facilities	 left	 by	 the	 Japanese	 colonists.	 As	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 the	 heritage	
significantly	prompted	the	development	of	Harbin’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	However,	in	winter	





















case	 is	 the	 chronic	Minamata	Disease	35	which	 appeared	 in	 the	 Songhua	 river	 between	 1958	 to	 1982,	
caused	by	poison	effluents	discharged	by	the	Jilin	Petrochemical	Corporation	(Wang,	2010).	Meanwhile,	
the	 surface	water	 still	 occupied	82%	of	Harbin’s	 tap	water	provision.	 It	was	highly	possible	 that	many	
Harbin	citizens	had	noticed	the	problem	of	tap	water	and	thus	turned	to	groundwater	from	self-built	tap	
water	supply	facilities.	




As	Figure	5.5	shows,	 if	we	ignore	this	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	 it	would	seem	that	 it	 is	the	tap	





tap	 water	 provision.	 The	 water	 company	 has	 two	 problems,	 the	 insufficient	 water	 supply	 and	 the	
insufficient	pipeline	coverage,	as	analysed	previously.	The	local	government	has	four	problems:	first,	they	
had	three	disjunctions	between	urban	plan	and	realities.	Second,	they	had	problematic	and	paradoxical	
data.	 Third,	 they	 kept	 a	 tacit	 encouragement	 attitude	 towards	 the	 implementation	 of	 Non-Tap-Water	
Coping	Strategy	 in	 the	context	of	 fragmented	tap	water	distribution,	and	 later	 legalised	these	 facilities	








and	 responsibility	 to	 produce	 portable	 tap	 water.	 Holding	 that	 power	 and	 responsibility,	 consumers	
developed	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	to	deal	with	the	fragmented	tap	water	distribution,	the	self-
built	water	supply	facilities.	With	the	government’s	tacit	consent	and	the	power	and	responsibility	shift	
from	government	 to	consumer,	 the	uncontrolled	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	 finally	ended	up	as	a	
sustainability	crisis	of	groundwater	over-exploitation.		
Note	 here	 that	 this	 combination	 has	 four	main	 characteristics.	 First,	 this	 combination	 is	 a	 contingent	
combination	model.	 It	means	that	few	can	predict	the	whole	picture	of	both	this	combination	and	the	
sustainability	 crisis	 before	 it	 really	 happened.	 Such	 unpredictability,	 being	 one	 of	 the	 general	
characteristics	 of	 nearly	 every	 sociogenic	 water	 sustainability	 crisis,	 challenged	 the	 scientific	
methodologies	 as	 being	 recognised	 traditionally	 as	 the	most	 effective	way	 of	 predicting	 sustainability	
crises.	 Second,	 a	 series	 of	 casual	 connections	 can	 be	 built	 between	 every	 single	 condition	 and	 agent,	
another	general	feature	for	sociogenic	sustainability	crises.	For	example,	the	social	condition	of	political	




























The	 implementation	 of	 this	 control	 was	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 pipeline.	When	 the	
pipeline	reached	new	areas,	numerous	self-drilled	wells	would	be	abandoned.	Moreover,	the	groundwater	
scarcity	crisis	also	caused	the	decrease	of	the	water	table,	which	exhausted	numerous	self-drilled	wells.	


















Harbin	 Chemical	 Corporation	 owned	 dozens	 of	 trucks	 just	 for	 carrying	 tap	 water	 (Harbin	 Municipal	
Government,	1998b).		










Another	 possible	 positive	 aspect	 of	 this	 crisis	 is	 that	 it	 may	 have	 prevented	 a	 more	 catastrophic	
environmental	disaster	from	happening.	If	the	tap	water	consumer	in	Harbin	relied	too	much	on	the	tap	
water,	sourcing	from	the	polluted	Songhua	River,	it	is	possible	that	the	chronic	Minamata	Disease	could	
have	 had	 a	 much	 more	 destructive	 effect	 in	 general.	 Between	 1957	 to	 1982,	 the	 PetroChina	 Jilin	


















self-built	 water	 supply	 facility	 was	 combined	 with	 the	 inefficient	 water	 administration,	 together	 they	
caused	 a	 ‘sociogenic	 water	 sustainability	 crisis’,	 namely	 the	 overexploitation	 of	 Harbin’s	 groundwater	
resource.	 This	 crisis	 also	had	a	domino	effect	 that	 triggered	 a	 series	of	 other	 social	 and	public	 health	



































data	 and	 information	between	different	 reports	 and	 various	 sources.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 lack	of	 concrete	











data	 and	 information	between	different	 reports	 and	 various	 sources.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 lack	of	 concrete	
information	 and	 data	 from	 official	 channels,	 some	 online	 documents	 and	 reports	 have	 detailed	
information	regarding	this	pollution	accident.	The	author	will	mark	the	sources	of	these	details.	
As	shown	in	Figure	5.6	and	5.7,	the	incident	occurred	between	13:30	to	13:45,	13	November	2005.	Two	
































































pollution	 of	 the	 Songhua	 River	 and	 briefed	 the	 emergency	 response:	 ‘Experts	 have	 been	 assigned	 to	








Harbin	 on	 25	 November	 2005.	 Its	 peak	 concentration	 of	 nitrobenzene	 was	 33.15	 times	 above	 the	
permissible	level	of	China’s	standard	of	tap	water	source,	0.017mg/L.	There	were	few	reports	about	the	










same	 excuse	 as	 the	 first	 announcement	 of	 the	 Harbin’s	municipal	 government,	 pipeline	maintenance	
(Wang,	 Duan	 and	 Wang,	 2005).	 Compared	 to	 the	 media	 reports	 about	 Harbin’s	 tap	 water	 provision	












department	 of	 Jilin	 province	 showed	 that	 after	 five	 hours	 of	 the	 explosion	 the	 information	 had	 been	
delivered	to	the	duty	office	of	NEPA,	although	the	relevant	data	of	the	pollution	was	not	included	given	

































In	respect	 to	the	historical	condition,	 there	are	three	historical	conditions	worth	mentioning.	First,	 the	















established	an	effective	partnership	 framework	 that	 coordinate	 various	 relevant	departments	 into	 the	


















site	 and	 the	 downstream	 location	 of	 Harbin.	 Another	 geographical	 condition	 was	 the	 close	 distance	
between	the	petrochemical	plant	and	the	river,	as	shown	in	Figure	5.10,	which	had	been	argued	by	some	
environmentalists	as	the	‘most	direct	reason’	of	the	toxic	spill	crisis	(Su	et	al.,	2005).	Finally,	the	Songhua	
River	 is	a	special	 river	since	 it	connects	two	powerful	countries:	Russia	and	China.	 It	 is	because	of	 this	













its	report,	no	 independent	third	party	 laboratory	had	been	invited	 in	the	 investigation	of	this	pollution	
incident.	Meanwhile,	the	mission	team	could	not	get	access	to	either	the	water	sample	or	the	first-hand	
information.		






by	the	 ice.	Given	the	test	result,	 the	concentration	of	nitrobenzene	 is	one	fourth	of	that	 in	water	 (The	
UNEP	mission	team,	2005,	p.7).	Those	trapped	pollutants	would	be	released	into	the	water	body	again	
when	the	ice	melted	in	the	spring	season,	causing	a	secondary	pollution	of	the	river.		
Another	 significant	 environmental	 change	 in	 the	 Songhua	 River	 was	 triggered	 artificially.	 The	 Jilin	
municipal	 government,	 through	 a	 negotiation	 with	 the	 State	 Grid	 Corporation	 of	 China,	 managed	 to	
persuade	 them	 into	 releasing	 the	water	 stored	 in	Fengman	and	Xiao	Fengman	 reservoirs	 to	dilute	 the	
pollutant	and	speed	up	its	movement	in	the	river.		











and	 the	polluted	 fire-fighting	water	 into	 the	 river.	 Figure	 5.11	 shows	A	 simulation	of	 explosion	 scene.	
Another	news	report	further	pointed	out	that	the	fire	accident	like	this	case	should	have	readied	a	fence	
to	baffle	 the	polluted	 fire-fighting	water	 from	spreading	 (Wang,	Duan	and	Wang,	2005).	 Ironically,	 this	











Harbin	 citizen	 respectively.	 The	 first	 cultural	 pattern	 was	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 seven-day	 tap	 water	
suspension	implemented	by	the	Songyuan	municipal	government.	To	a	large	extent,	this	news	was	ignored	
by	journalists	and	academia.	Songyuan	forms	a	sharp	comparison	to	Harbin.	They	both	tried	to	conceal	


























higher	 leaders	 to	 make	 the	 decision.”	 The	 leaders	 of	 the	 municipal	 government	 finally	 issued	 the	
announcement	using	the	excuse	of	pipeline	maintenance.	But	at	around	10	pm	on	that	night,	the	Prime	
Minister	Wen	Jiabao,	who	represent	the	stance	of	central	government,	informed	us	that	we	must	disclose	













In	 the	 context	 of	 these	 five	 conditions,	 the	 hybrid	 production	 process	 was	 dysfunctional	 again.	 The	















is	 the	 first	 time	 in	Harbin’s	history	 that	 the	municipal	 government	had	 to	 issue	 three	announcements	
within	two	days.		
Harbin	 was	 one	 of	 only	 two	 cities	 in	 the	 Heilongjiang	 province	 that	 had	 the	 capacity	 for	 monitoring	
nitrobenzene.	Without	any	experience	in	dealing	with	this	pollution,	the	Harbin’s	municipal	government	
spent	3	million	Yuan,	plus	another	10	million	Yuan	from	the	provincial	government,	to	purchase	equipment.	
100	environmental	experts	had	been	assigned	 to	Harbin	as	different	 task	 forces(Heilongjiang	Scientific	
Consultative	Committee,	2011).	From	24	November,	a	series	of	official	news	conferences	were	held	by	the	
municipal	 government	 to	 provide	 the	 latest	 important	 information.	 Experts	 began	 to	 broadcast	 TV	
programs	 to	 explain	 the	 situation.	 The	 price	 of	 bottled	 water	 was	 strictly	 monitored	 and	 controlled,	
whereas	 1300	 tons	 of	 bottled	water	were	 delivered	 from	 a	 nearby	 city,	 Shenyang,	 to	 Harbin;	 All	 918	


















well.	 However,	 the	 effect	 was	 not	 satisfactory.	 The	 main	 problem	 was	 the	 inadequate	 reaction	 time	
between	activated	carbon	and	the	pollutant.	Special	attention	had	been	spent	on	the	intake	point	of	the	
tap	water	provision	system.	The	result	of	this	emergency	experiment	showed	that	in	one	to	two	hours	of	









were	 so	 closely	 linked	 that	 they	 had	 been	 integrated	 with	 each	 other.	 As	 Figure	 5.10	 shows,	 the	
government	 and	 the	 water	 company	 constituted	 a	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 with	much	more	
power	 than	 they	had	had	 respectively	before.	As	has	been	argued	 in	 section	3.8,	 the	 institutionalised	






the	aforementioned	activities	of	 this	Hybrid	 Institutional	Architecture	were	 inaccessible.	Neither	could	


























cover	 most	 of	 the	 citizens,	 along	 with	 the	 problematic	 quality	 of	 tap	 water.	 Compared	 to	 this,	 the	
dysfunction	happened	in	the	second	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	was	much	more	devastating	in	
two	 senses.	 First,	 the	 Tap	Water	 Coping	 Strategy	 was	 dysfunctional;	 Second,	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	









Strategy,	 the	only	 valid	 consumer	 coping	 strategy	was	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	 Strategy,	which	 includes	
bottled	water,	barrelled	water,	and	self-built	water	supply	facilities.	However,	given	the	temporality	and	








two	 conflicting	 government	 announcements	 in	 one	 day	 were	 definitely	 a	 problematic	 public	
communication	 between	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 and	 consumer,	 which	 further	 promote	 the	
social	 turmoil.	 Under	 this	 condition,	 the	 most	 vulnerable	 victims	 were	 those	 powerless	 citizens	 who	
neither	 could	 afford	 the	 bottled	 and	 barrelled	 water	 as	 coping	 strategies	 nor	 had	 access	 to	 genuine	
information.	
Actually,	 Harbin’s	municipal	 government	 tried	 to	 aid	 those	 vulnerable	 citizens	who	were	 incapable	 of	
affording	 the	 High	 Cost	 Commercial	 Coping	 Strategies.	Millions	 of	 Yuan	were	 assigned	 as	 the	 specific	













5.4.3 The	 domino	 effect	 of	 the	 second	 sociogenic	 water	
sustainability	crisis	





























Strategy.	 In	both	cases,	 in	 the	context	of	 five	conditions,	 the	balance	between	the	Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture,	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	and	water	crises	was	thrown	off,	which	triggered	two	
types	of	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	in	their	respective	contingent	combination	model.		
For	 the	Harbin’s	municipal	 government,	 the	 pivotal	 point	 of	 these	 two	 sociogenic	water	 sustainability	
crises	 is	 different.	 In	 the	 first	 crisis,	 the	 pivotal	 point	 is	 the	 water	 problem.	 As	 a	 result,	 municipal	
government	 needs	 to	 recover	 groundwater	 resources	 and	 stop	 shift	 power	 of	 water	 production	 to	

































supervision	 department	 D.	 All	 interview	 quotations	 in	 this	 chapter	 are	 translated	 by	 the	 author	 from	
Chinese	into	English.	
6.2 The	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 of	
Harbin’s	tap	water	provision	system	


































Departmental	 Dispute	 and	 Settlement	 Procedure,	 Water	 Pollution	 in	 Reservoir	 and	 Local	 Villager	
Resettlement,	and	Wuchang	Gets	Water	From	Mopanshan	After	Harbin,	are	hybrid	problems.	This	means	
that	they	are	triggered	by	two	departments,	the	Mopanshan	Reservoir	and	Harbin	Municipal	Department.	


































locations	 to	 construct	 Harbin’s	 secondary	 water	 source	 was	 submitted	 to	 the	 National	 Planning	





(Ji,	 2011).	 Another	 advantage	 of	Mopanshan	 Reservoir	 was	 that	 it	 did	 not	 have	 as	many	 surrounded	
villages	as	the	other	two	reservoirs.	However,	as	will	be	revealed	later,	the	problems	of	reservoir	migration	











was	 not	 about	 Mopanshan	 Reservoir	 but	 another	 Reservoir,	 which	 had	 been	 granted	 by	 the	 central	
government	in	the	1990s.	In	contrast,	the	construction	proposal	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	was	still	full	of	
uncertainties.	 The	 major	 focus	 of	 Mopanshan	 Reservoir	 project,	 therefore,	 was	 an	 environmental	
evaluation.	 A	 special	 team	 was	 established	 and	 assigned	 by	 municipal	 PCC	 to	 explore	 the	 upstream	






















In	 sum,	 the	 construction	 of	 Mopanshan	 Reservoir	 is	 not	 specifically	 aiming	 to	 deal	 with	 consumer’s	
plummeting	trust	in	Harbin’s	tap	water	after	the	Songhua	River	Toxic	Spill	Crisis,	but	the	latter	definitely	
prompted	the	development	of	the	former.	From	this	sense,	Mopanshan	Reservoir	can	be	deemed	as	a	













administrative	 relationship	with	 SSLE,	which	meant	 they	 had	 to	 negotiate	with	 the	 latter.	Mopanshan	
reservoir	was	just	located	inside	the	deforestation	areas	of	SSLE,	so	was	suffering	from	the	resultant	water	






its	 revenue.	 According	 to	 the	 policy	 of	 Natural	 Forest	 Protection	 Project,	 the	 annual	 allowable	
deforestation	volume	for	SSLE	was	105,000	cubic	meters.	This	was	a	huge	amount	of	revenue.	It	was	also	
impossible	for	Harbin’s	municipal	government	to	take	over	all	the	nine	State-Owned	Logging	Enterprises	





had	 transferred	 the	plants	 in	 the	upstream	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	 to	 cash	 crops	 and	herbs	 so	 as	 to	


















Impact	Scrutiny	and	Environmental	 Impact	Assessment	on	this	 investment	project.	 In	2003,	the	Harbin	
government	finally	decided	to	reject	this	investment	project.	
However,	 in	November	2002,	 the	Fenghuangshan	Wetland	was	 still	developed	as	a	 resort.	The	central	
government	approved	the	establishment	of	 ‘Fenghuangshan	National	Park’,	paving	the	way	for	SSLE	to	
plan	two	tour	routes	in	it,	along	which	were	dozens	of	public	toilets	draining	the	excretion	directly	into	the	
reservoir	 without	 treatment	 (Harbin	 Daily,	 2008).	 However,	 it	 insisted	 that	 the	 exploration	 of	 the	
Fenghuangshan	Wetland	was	only	a	win-win	developmental	cooperation	with	Mopanshan	Reservoir.	
In	 2011,	 the	 dispute	 between	 Harbin’s	municipal	 government	 and	 SSLE	 finally	 settled	 down	with	 the	
















Harbin’s	 municipal	 government	 claimed	 the	 property	 rights	 of	 water	 resources	 in	Mopanshan,	 but	 it	
cannot	 prevent	 the	 SSLE	 from	 logging	 the	 timbers	 around	 the	water	 body	 and	 causing	 environmental	
pollution.	 Neither	 can	 it	 prevent	 the	 development	 of	 tourism	 industry	 near	 the	 water	 source	 of	
Mopanshan	Reservoir.	With	no	law	or	regulation	to	draw	a	clear	line	between	the	interests	of	agents	with	
equivalent	administration	levels,	a	negotiation	was	arranged	between	them	by	their	senior	department,	
Heilongjiang	 provincial	 government.	While	 rejecting	 all	 of	 the	 external	 interventions,	 this	 negotiation	
integrated	the	conflict	into	an	internal	administrative	framework.	At	the	same	time,	it	can	be	observed	






enterprise	 and	 Forestry	 Bureau,	 and	 between	 SSLE	 and	 its	 subordinated	 enterprises.	 In	 2014,	 several	
employees	 in	 SSLE,	 including	 its	 former	main	 director,	 were	 punished	 for	 embezzling	 public	 funds	 by	
















agricultural	pollution,	 the	 rural	 kitchen	waste	pollution,	and	 the	potential	environmental	 risk	of	petrol	
stations	 nearby	 villages.	 The	 fourth	 pollution	 source	 was	 the	 pesticide	 sprayed	 by	 Shanghetun	 State-













and	 10,000	 tons	 of	 untreated	 household	 sewage	 and	 100,000	 tons	 of	 untreated	 wastewater	 were	
discharged	to	the	environment	(Dongbeinet,	2011).	In	each	summer,	the	swollen	surface	flows	will	bring	
these	pollutants	to	Mopanshan	Reservoir.	The	result	of	water	quality	monitoring	indicated	that	the	organic	























of	 the	 urban	 pipeline	 network,	 the	 Harbin’s	municipal	 government	 had	 enacted	 two	 announcements	
about	land	acquisition	in	2003	and	2007,	corresponding	respectively	to	the	construction	period	of	the	first	
and	second	stage	of	the	project	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	2003;	2007b).	In	














As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 6.3,	Wuchang	 is	 the	 nearest	 city	 of	Mopanshan	 Reservoir.	 It	 also	 held	 the	 direct	
administration	 power	 of	 Mopanshan	 Reservoir.	 As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 Wuchang	 is	 administrated	 by	
Harbin’s	municipal	government,	so	even	though	it	was	76.2	kilometres	away	from	Mopanshan	Reservoir,	
it	had	water	supplied	from	Mopanshan	Reservoir	later	than	Harbin.		





















in	 the	work	of	construction,	developing	 industries	of	 transportation,	 food	service,	pipeline	production,	
tourism,	 and	 aquaculture’	 (Liu,	 2004).	 Here	 it	 is	 obvious	 that	Wuchang	 tried	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 positive	
aspects	 of	 reservoir	 construction.	 In	 July	 2005,	 an	 official	 from	 Wuchang’s	 agriculture	 department	
announced	 that	Wuchang	 had	 designated	 the	 arable	 land	 around	 the	water	 catchment	 area	 into	 the	
‘Organic	Food	Base’.	Given	his	 statement,	 since	2006,	all	of	 the	 farming	within	 the	base	would	strictly	




















time	to	grow	up.	Besides	 the	 risks	 listed	above,	once	 the	 long-distance	pipeline	connects	with	 the	old	
urban	pipeline,	the	tap	water	quality	would	still	be	reduced	from	a	potable	level	to	a	semi-potable	level.		








As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 6.4,	 A	 and	B	 are	 in	 dire	 straits	 now.	A	 series	 of	water	 companies	merge	 and	 split	
impaired	 A’s	 administration.	 Both	 its	 direct	 and	 extra	 incomes	 were	 limited.	 Due	 to	 the	 construction	
project	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir,	it	was	running	with	a	huge	debt.	Since	they	were	strongly	opposed	to	
privatisation,	the	limited	conditions	made	it	incapable	of	either	updating	the	old	urban	tap	water	pipeline	

































of	 labour	 rose.	 However,	 the	 price	 of	water	 is	 fixed	 no	matter	 how	much	 the	 price	 of	 the	 other	 raw	
materials	changed.	It	is	because	the	water	price	is	the	fundamental	basis	of	everything	in	the	market.	If	


























functioned	as	a	 financing	vehicle.	Up	 to	 July	2011,	 its	 total	 assets	were	8.18	billion	Yuan,	but	 its	 total	



















its	 total	assets	was	9.65	billion	Yuan,	 its	 total	debt	was	6.71	billion	Yuan,	accounting	69.5%	of	 its	 total	
assets.	Both	interviewees	from	A	and	B	acknowledged	that	this	debt	was	a	huge	burden.	The	interviewee	
from	 B	 thought	 that	 the	 government	 should	 share	 some	 financial	 burdens,	 because	 the	 project	 of	
Mopanshan	Reservoir	is	a	municipal	public	project.	The	interviewee	from	health	supervision	department	


















Obviously,	 both	 interviewees	 strongly	 opposed	 the	 attempt	of	 privatisation.	 Their	worries	were	 about	






















The	mistake	of	 the	 interviewee	 from	D	 implicates	a	problem	of	urban	 tap	water	administration	 in	 the	
Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture:	it	demands	effective	cooperation	between	multiple	parallel	departments,	
but	they	are	sometimes	unfamiliar	with	each	other’s	working	areas.	
6.4.6 New	 tap	 water	 national	 standard	 and	 old	 water	 treatment	
equipment	
The	interviewees	from	C	and	D	both	thought	the	new	national	domestic	tap	water	standard,	including	106	




upgrade	our	water	 treatment	equipment.	 Even	 capital	 cities	were	 in	 this	plight,	 not	 to	mention	 those	
secondary	and	third	tier	cities,’	he/she	said.	Moreover,	he/she	indicated	in	addition	that	‘from	what	I	know,	
no	city	in	North	China	possesses	the	equipment	of	advanced	water	treatment.	Such	equipment	is	not	only	
lacking	 in	Harbin,	but	also	 in	Shenyang,	Liaoning	and	Jilin	provinces.	 […]	Currently,	Harbin	also	has	the	
demand	for	such	equipment,	but	it	depends	on	whether	we	can	receive	enough	funds	to	purchase	them.’	
Without	an	advanced	water	 treatment	plant,	 the	 interviewee	 from	B	admitted	 that	without	advanced	











The	 interviewee	 from	 A	 admitted	 that	 Harbin’s	 secondary	 water	 supply	 facilities	 were	 regulated	 by	
MCHURD	 and	 property	 management	 company	 for	 every	 resident	 community.	 Without	 any	 national	
regulation,	its	regulation	differed	from	city	to	city.	He/she	thought	it	was	a	potential	loophole	for	urban	




































Given	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 Super-Ministry	 Reform,	 all	 issues	 regarding	 tap	 water	 provision	 are	
administrated	by	the	Harbin	Municipal	Government.	However,	if	one	takes	a	closer	look,	even	in	municipal	






Commission	 and	 Municipal	 Environmental	 Protection	 Bureau	 (MEPB).	 They	 are	 shown	 in	 Figure	 6.5.	




























behaviour.	Why	 did	 they	 supply	 you	 tap	water	 if	 their	 needs	were	 not	 satisfied?’	 In	 the	 end,	 he/she	









As	 introduced	 in	 the	previous	 section,	 interviewees	 from	A	and	B	opposed	privatisation	because	 they	
questioned	the	professionalism	and	security	of	private	capitals.	But	the	interviewee	from	C	was	concerned	






presumptions	 demonstrated	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture,	 the	 relationship	
between	 government	 and	 the	water	 company	was	 so	 close	 that	 even	 government	 official	 treat	water	
company	as	a	government	department.	From	the	government	perspective,	citizens’	livelihood	and	social	
stability	were	the	priority	tasks	for	water	company	as	SOE.	Thus,	the	deficit	and	debt	of	the	water	company	











level	 as	 the	 ambiguous	 power	 boundaries	 between	municipal	 government	 departments.	 As	 has	 been	
discussed	in	Chapters	3	and	4,	this	is	the	reflection	and	outcome	of	the	institutional	incoherency	in	power	
flow.	















and	 A’s	 data	 were	 not	 valid,	 the	 only	 valid	 data	 was	 from	 the	 MEPB’.	 In	 the	 interview	 with	 D,	 the	









of	 A	 were	 derived	 from	 two	 different	 government	 departments.	 It	 is	 still	 unclear	 whether	 there	 is	 a	
cooperation	between	the	two	departments.	But	it	was	clear	that	the	administration	of	A	was	much	more	
complex	 and	 decentralised	 than	 people	 have	 previously	 presumed.	 The	 dispersed	 power	 and	 the	
ambiguous	power	boundaries	between	government	departments	reinforced	one	another.	
The	inconsistent	power	flow	between	departments	was	evidenced	in	the	interview	with	the	interviewee	
from	 A,	 who	 claimed	 that	 ‘some	 water	 companies	 were	 administrated	 by	 the	 MWAB,	 some	 are	
administrated	by	the	MCHURD.	[…]	This	was	because	of	the	problematic	administrative	structure.	In	the	
past,	we	were	not	administrated	by	the	MWAB	but	the	MCHURD.	Later,	central	government	initiated	the	
reform	 (Integrated	Water	Administration	Reform,	analysed	 in	 section	4.3.4).	However,	 this	 reform	was	
problematic,	but	at	that	time	it	was	too	late	to	rectify.	As	a	result,	those	water	companies	which	changed	
their	administrative	departments	were	kept	in	that	status,	but	those	who	did	not	change	also	kept	their	







MHURD.’	 He/she	 later	 clarified	 that	water	 companies	 in	Harbin	were	 in	 charge	 by	MWAB,	which	was	
administrated	by	the	municipal	government.	However,	it	still	received	operational	guidance	from	MCHURD.	

































department.	 Being	 treated	 like	 a	 government	 department	 in	many	ways	 by	 itself,	 the	water	 company	
thought	the	supervision	from	another	government	department	was	an	effective	third-party	supervision,	
because	 it	 represented	 the	 government.	 The	 interviewee	 from	 water	 company	 A	 considered	 the	














fact,	 our	 country	 already	 established	 a	 water	 quality	 management	 system,	 including	 testing	 and	










problem.	The	 interviewee	 from	water	 treatment	plant	B	 claimed	 that	 there	were	 two	main	problems:	





























The	 interviewee	 from	 C	 reiterated	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 pipeline.	 He/she	 presented	 an	 example	 about	
potable	water	supply	in	Daqing,	a	city	located	in	north	China.	‘We	went	to	a	resident	community	in	Daqing	
where	 they	 supplied	 potable	 tap	 water.	 The	 tap	 water	 was	 supplied	 from	 water	 treatment	 plant	 to	








incoherency	 in	 tap	water	quality	 information	disclosure	between	 the	water	 company	and	government	
department	can	be	observed	in	the	interviews.		
The	interviewee	from	water	treatment	plant	B	claimed	that	their	main	work	was	tap	water	production,	




the	 tap	 water	 quality	 information.	 ‘It	 was	 not	 the	 water	 company’s	 responsibility	 to	 release	 the	
information.	 We	 submitted	 all	 information	 to	 the	 government,	 and	 they	 needed	 to	 build	 an	 open	








water	 company	 already	 spent	 a	 great	 amount	 of	 effort	 to	 promote	 information	 disclosure.	 The	
government	department	also	put	the	water	quality	test	result	on	their	website	for	everyone	to	check.’	
He/she	 thought	 the	government	website	was	 the	most	authoritative	open	communication	channel	 for	








treatment	 plant	 and	water	 company	 expressed	 their	willingness	 to	 disclose	 the	 information,	 but	 they	
emphasised	that	they	were	not	empowered	to	do	so.	Therefore,	the	government	became	the	only	agent	
that	held	 the	power	of	disclosing	 tap	water	quality	 information.	Meanwhile,	 it	 seems	 like	government	
departments	had	no	idea	of	its	importance	and	position	in	information	disclosure,	and	presumed	that	the	
water	company	had	promoted	the	tap	water	quality.	The	final	result	of	such	incoherency	was	that	even	
three	 interviewees	 did	 not	 know	where	 the	 information	was	 published,	 not	 to	mention	whether	 it	 is	
available	to	the	tap	water	consumer.	Regarding	information	disclosure,	MWAB	did	nothing	more	than	post	




The	 previous	 three	 sections	 analysed	 the	 limited	 conditions	 and	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 three	 agents	 in	
Harbin’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	They	formed	a	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	that	was	only	
able	to	supply	semi-potable	tap	water	to	consumer,	who	had	to	treat	the	semi-potable	tap	water	again	in	
terms	 of	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix.	 As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 6.7,	 in	 this	 process,	 there	were	 three	
limited	conditions	and	six	problems	that	directly	promoted	the	generation	of	semi-potable	tap	water	and	





















water	did	not	outline	 the	 intricate	 interconnections	and	mutual	 influences	between	 these	 three	main	



































their	 production.’	 Given	 that,	 he/she	 believed	 that	 tap	 water	 was	 the	 safest	 water	 for	 consumers.	
‘Compared	to	western	countries	where	the	regulation	was	much	more	effective,	in	China	the	consumer	
had	no	idea	what	was	inside	their	beverage.	So	the	safest	way	of	drinking	water	was	to	drink	tap	water.’		
The	 interviewee	from	A	also	criticised	the	domestic	 tap	water	 filtration	equipment.	 ‘The	service	 life	of	
domestic	 water	 filtration	 equipment	 was	 limited,	 and	 they	 could	 not	 have	 the	 same	 function	 as	 the	
filtration	equipment	we	used	in	tap	water	treatment	plants.	They	might	not	be	replaced	for	years.	Thus,	it	
might	intensify	the	pollution.	In	the	water	treatment	plant,	there	was	a	strict	rule	to	change	the	filter	every	







to	Low	Cost	Traditional	Coping	Strategy,	arguing	 in	particular	 that	drinking	boiled	 tap	water	 instead	of	
other	beverages	was	good	for	children’s	health.	
The	 interviewee	 from	 D	 expressed	 a	 similar	 opinion,	 emphasising	 that	 there	were	 risks	 of	 secondary	
pollution	 in	 bottled	water	 and	 barrelled	water.	 He/she	 claimed	 that	 he/she	 only	 drank	 tap	water	 and	
thought	 it	was	 the	 safest	 choice.	He/she	also	 implicated	his/her	normalisation	 to	 Low	Cost	Traditional	
Coping	Strategy	through	arguing	that	‘it	was	not	necessary	to	have	a	large	amount	of	residual	chlorine	if	

















































Institutional	 Architecture	 in	 Harbin’s	 current	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system.	 This	 section	 aims	 to	
retrospect	the	answer	of	three	subordinate	research	questions	and	one	main	research	question	raised	in	
Section	1.2.	 It	 illustrates	 the	main	contributions	of	 theoretic	 thread	 functioning	as	 the	skeleton	of	 this	
thesis	analysis.	
The	 first	 subordinate	 research	 question	 is:	 what	 kind	 of	 tap	 water	 is	 supplied	 to	 China’s	 tap	 water	
consumer?	 To	 reply	 this	 question,	 this	 thesis	 coined	 two	 concepts,	 the	 semi-potable	 tap	 water,	 and	
potable	 tap	water,	 to	describe	 the	quality	of	 tap	water	 supplied	 from	China’s	 current	urban	 tap	water	





water’s	 distinctive	 quality	 degree	 between	 undrinkable	 water	 and	 potable	 water,	 consumer	 coping	




China’s	 current	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 as	 a	 ‘source	 to	 consumer’	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	
provision	system.	To	highlight	the	core	of	this	system,	this	thesis	coined	the	concept	of	Hybrid	Institutional	
Architecture.	The	Hybrid	 Institutional	Architecture	 is	defined	as	an	 institutional	architecture	of	China’s	
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of	 China’s	 fresh	 water.	 Moreover,	 to	 unveil	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 in	 a	 practical	 sense,	
Chapter	 6	 presented	 a	 case	 study	 of	 Harbin’s	 current	 tap	water	 provision	 system	 based	 on	 interview	
materials.	
The	third	subordinate	research	question	is:	on	the	basis	of	the	answers	to	the	first	and	second	question,	







government’s	 tacit	 consent,	market,	media’s	 propaganda,	 low	 tap	 water	 rate,	 water	 crises	 and	 social	
memory,	and	knowledge	and	 information	gap.	As	a	production	process	of	potable	water,	 it	makes	 the	
consumer	share	the	responsibility	of	water	production	with	other	agents	in	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	
semi-potable	 tap	water	provision	system.	Moreover,	 there	 is	a	mutual	 self-reinforcement	between	the	






consumer’s	dual	 identities	 in	 ‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process,	and	the	problematic	
public	 propaganda.	 Accordingly,	 this	 thesis	 argues	 that	 Chinese	 tap	 water	 consumer	 has	 an	
institutionalised	 distrust	 in	 semi-potable	 tap	 water.	 This	 institutionalised	 distrust	 is	 evidenced	 in	 the	
prevalent	 adoption	 and	 normalisation	 of	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix.	 The	 outcome	 of	 such	 an	




outbreak	 of	 sociogenic	 water	 sustainability	 crisis	 demands	 a	 certain	 contingent	 combination	 model	
composed	of	five	interconnected	conditions:	history	condition,	geography	condition,	political	condition,	
environmental	condition,	and	culture	condition.	Chapter	5	presents	case	studies	of	two	sociogenic	water	





According	to	the	retrospection	of	 research	rationale,	 this	section	summarises	the	basic	 findings	of	 this	
thesis.		
First,	 this	 thesis	 coined	 a	 series	 of	 crucial	 yet	 undeveloped	 concepts:	 the	 semi-potable	 tap	water,	 the	
Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	the	normalisation	of	semi-potable	
tap	 water,	 the	 institutionalised	 distrust	 in	 semi-potable	 tap	 water,	 and	 the	 incoherencies	 in	





















power	 and	money.	Moreover,	Wittfogel,	 Swyngedouw,	 Bakker,	 Molle	 and	 Kaika	 highlight	 the	 internal	
political	 incoherency	 in	 water	 resources	 administration	 mechanisms	 in	 other	 countries;	 Polanyi	 and	
Bakker’s	 theoretical	 accounts	 paves	 the	 way	 for	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 inconsistency	 in	 money	 flow	 that	
circulating	in	and	encapsulated	by	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	Meanwhile,	the	definition	of	Hybrid	
Institutional	 Architecture	 contributes	 to	 these	 theoretical	 accounts	 as	 a	 concrete	 case	 reflecting	 the	
political	 and	 economic	 incoherency	 existing	 in	 China.	 Compared	 to	 abstract	 theoretical	 accounts,	 it	
functions	more	like	a	practical	summarization	of	how	all	these	accounts	would	really	operate	in	a	specific	













academia,	 the	power	conflict	between	government	departments,	 the	development	 trajectory	of	water	
standards,	and	the	essential	reason	for	the	prosperous	market	of	bottled	and	barrelled	water.	The	analyses	




Sixth,	 this	 thesis	 coined	 the	concept	of	 the	contingent	combination	model	of	China’s	 sociogenic	water	
sustainability	crisis	in	the	case	study	of	Harbin.	This	analysis	not	only	differentiates	the	sociogenic	aspect	
of	 sustainability	 crisis	 but	 also	 provides	 a	 new	 research	optic	 for	 scholars	 and	 government	 officials	 to	
scrutinise	the	causes	and	influence	of	water	crisis,	so	as	to	have	new	modifications	in	their	research	on	
and	response	to	the	water	crisis.	
Seventh,	 the	 example	 of	 water	 is	 symptomatic	 of	 the	 wider	 societal	 phenomenon	 of	 incidences	 of	





























Institutional	Architecture	 in	 ‘source	 to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	 tap	water	provision	system	 is	by	
itself	the	root	of	consumer’s	powerlessness,	and	the	biggest	contribution	to	the	form	of	the	latent	social	
injustice	 behind	 such	 powerlessness.	 The	 power	 gap	 between	 consumer	 and	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture	has	 reached	a	high	 level	 that	 it	has	been	normalised	by	both	 the	officials	working	 in	 the	
architecture	 and	 consumers	 themselves.	 Such	 normalisation	 has	 been	 revealed	 in	 the	 case	 study	 of	
Chapter	6.	










tap	 water	 provision	 system	 break	 out,	 it	 would	 immediately	 expose	 the	 social	 injustice	 behind	 the	
consumer	stratification,	making	the	most	vulnerable	people	suffer	the	most	destructive	pollution.		
How	to	counteract	such	latent	social	injustice	is	still	an	open	question.	However,	what	can	be	assured	is	
that	 consumers	must	 develop	 an	 awareness	 to	 ‘de-normalise	 the	 normalisation’.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	
normalisation	 of	 semi-potable	 tap	 water,	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture,	 the	 ‘consumer	 to	 sip’	
potable	 water	 production	 process,	 and	 the	 consumer’s	 powerlessness	 and	 insecurity	 must	 be	 ‘de-
normalised’	 to	 reveal	 and	 capture	 the	 social	 injustice	 hiding	 inside	 them.	 It	 is	 only	 by	 identifying	 and	
acknowledging	such	social	injustice	can	China’s	current	urban	tap	water	provision	system	begin	to	make	
progress.	Thus,	the	author	of	this	thesis	would	like	to	elaborate	his	research	in	this	field	in	the	future	with	
a	dream	that	Chinese	consumers	can	enjoy	their	deserved	potable	tap	water	as	their	peers	in	developed	
countries.	
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